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ABSTRACT 
 
Scholarly debate on the legitimacy crisis of investment dispute 
resolution has focused on the ability of multinational corporations 
to interfere with the state’s right to regulate by challenging gov-
ernment measures in investor-state arbitration.  Prior work has ad-
dressed the hybrid public-private nature of investment treaties that 
allow foreign investors to sue sovereign states and emphasized the 
role of multinational corporations in international lawmaking.  The 
academic discourse misses entirely the fact that international in-
vestment law drastically impacts relationships within the corpora-
tion (between the shareholders, the management, and the board of 
directors) and alters the expectations about the corporation as a 
standard-form legal entity.  Remarkably, international investment 
law allows shareholders to bring in arbitration claims for damages 
for “reflective loss”—that is, loss incurred by shareholders indirect-
ly as a result of injury to their company.  Shareholders can bring 
these claims without consulting with the company’s management 
and irrespective of any claims by the corporation.  Thus, inherent 
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in investment arbitration is the ability of individual shareholders to 
make decisions affecting the company and to benefit at the expense 
of the corporation, its creditors, and other stakeholders. 
Drawing on case studies, this Article seeks to surface the extent 
of the impact of shareholder claims for reflective loss on corporate 
law and governance—the rules, structure, and processes of the 
management and control within the corporation.  Having estab-
lished the distortive impact of shareholder claims on the corporate 
legal entity, the Article further explores the ways to address the 
systemic problem of reflective loss claims.  It makes a normative 
argument:  in view of the policy goals of foreign investor protec-
tion, shareholder claims for reflective loss should be permitted in 
international investment law, but only in limited circumstances to 
curtail the disruption of corporate governance and to reduce the 
social costs of litigation.  The Article concludes by offering a novel 
private ordering solution to the problem of reflective loss claims.  It 
argues that the corporate distortion problem is best addressed at 
the level of individual corporations through targeted provisions in 
corporate charters and bylaws waiving the right of shareholders to 
bring reflective loss claims in investment arbitration. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
As a standard-form legal entity, the business corporation pro-
vides two types of asset protection.  It protects personal assets of its 
equity holders from the firm’s creditors (owner shielding) and 
firm’s assets from personal creditors of the equity holders (entity 
shielding).1  Such asset partitioning within the corporation creates 
common expectations among the firm’s shareholders and creditors 
as to the corporate form and the effect of contracts entered between 
the creditors and the corporation.2  Relying on these expectations, 
creditors provide financing to the firm.  In doing so, creditors 
know that they have a claim against the assets of the company and 
expect to be paid in bankruptcy ahead of shareholders according to 
the priority rules.  On their side, shareholders invest in the compa-
ny to benefit from capital appreciation or dividends payout.  They 
expect to have only a residual claim on the corporation’s assets up-
on its dissolution.  Unbeknownst to most creditors and sharehold-
ers, international investment law distorts this legal framework of 
corporate and bankruptcy law by allowing shareholders to bring 
claims for reflective loss in investment arbitration. 
Corporate attorneys are often critical of arbitration as a method 
of dispute resolution, dismissing arbitration as a proper forum for 
resolving corporate disputes.  The criticism is largely directed at 
domestic arbitration, such as an arbitration that can be commenced 
by domestic shareholders in the state of incorporation to challenge 
a merger.  Members of the Delaware judiciary have expressed con-
cerns that arbitral tribunals may disrupt the development of com-
mon law by misapplying Delaware corporate law and keeping 
                                                   
1  See Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, External and Internal Asset Parti-
tioning: Corporations and Their Subsidiaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 
2018) (“The corporate form partitions assets in two ways.  First, it provides owner 
shielding . . . second, the corporation provides entity shielding.”); see also Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE 
L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is . . . the 
shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s 
owners or managers.”) 
2  See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 8 (2d ed. 2009) (“Entity shielding doc-
trine is needed to create common expectations, among a firm and its various pre-
sent and potential creditors, concerning the effect that a contract between a firm 
and one of its creditors will have on the security available to the firm’s other cred-
itors.”). 
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their decisions private and confidential.3  To “preserve Delaware’s 
preeminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving dis-
putes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and 
technology matters,”  Delaware even attempted a state-sponsored 
arbitration program.4  Business disputes in these arbitrations were 
to be heard by the sitting judges of the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery acting as arbitrators.5  This arbitration experiment has ulti-
mately failed following an opinion by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which upheld a lower court decision 
that a confidential program of this type violates the First Amend-
ment right of public access.6 
But a bigger threat to the development of corporate law may 
come from the investment treaty arbitration.  This hybrid form of 
international arbitration, also called investor-state arbitration, al-
lows private parties to sue foreign governments for breaches of in-
vestor protection obligations.  Most important for corporate law 
and governance, international investment law allows foreign 
shareholders to bring claims for “reflective loss”—that is, loss in-
curred by shareholders as a result of injury to the company.  A 
common example of reflective loss is the diminution of the market 
value of shares resulting from the company’s loss. 
Domestic corporate law and international investment law take 
opposing views on shareholder standing for reflective loss.  Most 
advanced systems of corporate law prohibit shareholder claims for 
reflective loss based on the “no reflective loss” principle.7  The no 
                                                   
3  See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Appeals Court Throws Out Confidential Arbitra-
tion in Delaware, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:59 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/appeals-court-throws-out-
confidential-arbitration-in-delaware/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3SLV-UUZN] 
(emphasizing the concern that “corporate law would be made [in private and con-
fidential arbitration] but no one would know about it, making the life of compa-
nies and lawyers who advise them much harder.”). 
4  See Delaware Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009)). 
5  See id. at 522 (noting that sitting judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
would conduct private arbitrations under the state-sponsored arbitration). 
6  See id. at 521 (“[W]e find that there is a First Amendment right of access to 
Delaware's government-sponsored arbitrations. We will therefore affirm the order 
of the District Court.”). 
7  See, e.g., Agrotexim v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 25 (1995) (“It may 
be assumed that in the majority of national legal systems shareholders do not 
normally have the right to bring an action for damages in respect of an act or an 
omission that is prejudicial to ‘their’ company.”); see also Julien Chaisse & Lisa 
Zhuoyue Li, Shareholder Protection Reloaded: Redesigning the Matrix of Shareholder 
Claims for Reflective Loss, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 53 (2016) (explaining that in do-
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reflective loss principle is largely grounded on policy considera-
tions seeking to avoid double recovery,8 multiple claims and in-
consistent outcomes,9 and the negative impact on creditors and 
other shareholders.10 
By contrast, international investment law, which is driven by 
investor protection considerations, allows shareholders to bring 
claims for reflective loss, regardless of the claims by the corpora-
tion.11  Depending on the treaty, not only a controlling or majority 
shareholder,12 but even a minority shareholder13 may be able to 
                                                                                                                   
mestic jurisdictions, shareholders may not recover damages for loss in the value 
of their shares).  See generally id. at 54–58 (providing a review of corporate law 
provisions of countries that adhere to the “no reflective loss” principle, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France and Germany). 
8  See, e.g., Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 82 (discussing the various policy con-
siderations underlining the no reflective loss principle and the rationale as to why 
double recovery should be avoided). 
9  For instance, in decisions such as CME v. Czech Republic and Lauder v. Czech 
Republic, different tribunals rendered different decisions based on the same facts.  
See CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Partial Award, ¶ 620 (Sept. 13, 2001) (stating that the Respondent used the same 
pleadings and witness statements that were originally drafted for the Respondent 
in Lauder v. Czech Republic); Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award, ¶¶ 176–80 (Sept. 3, 2001); see also Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v. Italian 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, Decision on Respondent’s Application un-
der Rule 41(5), ¶¶ 20–21 (Mar. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Eskosol] (raising legal con-
sistency and certainty as an argument where Italy objected to an arbitration com-
menced by Italian company Eskosol S.p.A. following a separate arbitration which 
was brought against Italy and lost by Eskosol’s majority shareholder). 
10  See, e.g., Victor Joffe & James Mather, The Vanishing Exception Part One: 
How Rare Are Exceptions to the No Reflective Loss Principle, NEW L.J., Nov. 28, 2008, 
https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/vanishing-exception 
[https://perma.cc/BY58-AQY2] (“The existence of the rule is justified by the need 
both to prevent double recovery and to provide protection for the company’s 
creditors, who might be prejudiced if the shareholder’s claim were to succeed.”). 
11  See Christoph Schreuer, Shareholder Protection in International Investment 
Law, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., no. 3, 2005, at 4, https://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=426 [https://perma.cc/FA5X-MRZR] 
(noting that “practice since 1970 . . .  demonstrates an increasing willingness to 
grant an independent standing to shareholders.  Most of this practice [arose] in 
cases in which shareholders pursued their own claims through international in-
vestment arbitration.”).  See generally Chaisse & Li, supra note 7 (discussing the di-
vergence between domestic company and administrative law and international 
investment law with respect shareholder standing for reflective loss and arguing 
that “allowing recovery for reflective loss [under international investment law] is 
a sound legal principle from a practical, legal, and policy perspective.”). 
12  Investment arbitrations brought by majority or controlling shareholders 
are numerous.  See, e.g., EuroGas Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/14, Award, ¶ 325 (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/6233 [https://perma.cc/22RK-
WLVL] (“On 17 August 2013, Mr. Alexander  Danicek, an executive of Rozmin 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/5
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bring a claim in investor-state arbitration.14  In addition to direct 
shareholders, the right to sue for reflective loss may be available to 
indirect shareholders of the corporation.15  As a result, investment 
                                                                                                                   
from 2008 to 2014, stated before Austrian criminal authorities that EuroGas 
owned a 90% share in Rozmin.”); Emergofin B.V. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/16/35 (claimants held 68.01% of stock), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/751 
[https://perma.cc/9GQU-XKYT]; Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4, Notice of Arbitration (Feb. 27, 2014) (80% of 
stock), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/567 
[https://perma.cc/59JH-J7LN]; ASA International S.p.A. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/23, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 13, 2013) (85% of 
stock), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/525 
[https://perma.cc/ZG56-GRSE]; EVN AG v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/17, Notice of Arbitration (July 19, 2013) (67% of stock), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/518 
[https://perma.cc/9W8C-QU6H]. 
13  See RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/2005, 
Final Award, ¶ 608 (Sept. 12, 2010) (noting that “the recent jurisprudence from 
investment arbitration tribunals considering other investment treaties has con-
firmed the ability for shareholders to claim for measures taken against the com-
pany in which they hold shares and has been developed to the point accepting 
that minority shareholders have made claims for indirect damage.”).  Arbitrations 
involving minority shareholders are numerous.  See, e.g., Koch Minerals Sàrl v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/19, Award, ¶ 5.1 (Oct. 
30, 2017) (describing arbitrations involving minority shareholders, and, in this 
particular case, the minority shareholders held 25% of stock); Lanco Int’l, Inc. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, ¶ 10 (Dec. 8, 1998) (“[T]he fact that LANCO holds an equity share of 18.3% in 
the capital stock of the Grantee allows one to conclude that it is an investor . . . .”); 
Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Oct. 21, 2003) (involving two corporate claimants 
holding 20% and 5% of issued stock in a company formed and incorporated under 
the laws of Egypt); GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
¶ 1 (Nov. 15, 2004) (“GAMI owns 14.18% of the shares of Grupo Azucarero Mexico 
SA de CV (‘GAM’).”); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 19 (July 17, 
2003) (“CMS purchased the shares still remaining in government hands that rep-
resented 25% of TGN, and later purchased an additional 4.42% that had been as-
signed to an employee share program, thus totaling 29.42% of TGN.”). 
14  At least one tribunal held that it was irrelevant whether a shareholder was 
a majority or a minority shareholder as long as the treaty provided protection to 
shareholders.  See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 
(Apr. 30, 2004) (“The Respondent has not disputed that those shares are ‘owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly’ by the Claimants.  In that connection, it is irrele-
vant whether the shares are majority or minority shares.”). 
15  See, e.g., Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 165 (June 10, 2010) [here-
inafter Venezuela Holdings] (allowing an indirect shareholder to assert claims 
under a BIT relying on the literal reading of the treaty, which granted protection 
to investments without distinguishing between direct and indirect investments). 
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tribunals have allowed double recovery and rendered conflicting 
awards to related claimants at different levels of the corporate 
ownership structure.  To achieve greater consistency of arbitral 
awards and avoid double recovery, scholars have suggested claim 
consolidation, reliance on res judicata, and damage apportionment 
among related claimants, all procedural solutions.  However, as I 
argue in this Article, the problem with reflective loss claims goes 
further than double recovery, conflicting awards, and increased 
costs of dispute resolution.  Reflective loss claims distort corporate 
governance choices in a way that cannot be fixed by international 
law and civil procedure solutions. 
By granting shareholders a direct right to bring claims in arbi-
tration, investor protection treaties effectively create a separate 
class of stakeholders in the company—treaty-protected sharehold-
ers—whose rights are prioritized over the rights of the company as 
well as its management, creditors, and other stakeholders.  Ration-
al treaty-protected shareholders will always attempt to recover 
corporate losses regardless of the interests of the corporation and 
other stakeholders.  In doing so, they may interfere with manage-
ment decisions and may demand concessions at the expense of the 
company.  Shareholder claims also make it more difficult for the 
company to settle because a settlement agreement concluded by 
the company would not extinguish shareholder claims, making a 
responding state reluctant to settle.16  In addition, by collecting 
damages otherwise owed to the company, treaty-protected share-
holders prioritize their claims over the claims of creditors and all 
other stakeholders of the corporation.  This practice is especially 
dangerous for companies in financial distress.  Consequently, 
shareholder claims for reflective loss distort corporate law and 
governance—the rules, structure, and processes of the manage-
ment and control within the corporation.  And as the number of 
investor-state arbitrations continues to grow,17 so will the influence 
                                                   
16  See, e.g., David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties as Corporate Law: Sharehold-
er Claims and Issues of Consistency 33–34 (OECD, Working Papers on International 
Investment 2013/03), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3w9t44mt0v-en 
[https://perma.cc/83GC-A2AU] (explaining that “uncertainties associated with 
shareholder claims may complicate settlement negotiations.”) 
17  See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: 
INVESTMENT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, at xii, U.N. Sales No. E.17.II.D.3 (2017) 
[hereinafter UNCTAD 2017 REPORT] (“The rate of new treaty-based investor-State 
dispute settlement (ISDS) cases continued unabated.”).  Most recently, the 
UNCTAD reported on 62 new known ISDS cases initiated in 2016 pursuant to 
IIAs, which is “higher than the 10-year average of 49 cases per year (2006–2015).”  
Id. at 114.  By the beginning of 2017, “the total number of publicly known ISDS 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/5
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of international investment law on domestic corporate law and 
governance. 
This Article has two goals.  First, it seeks to examine how 
shareholder claims for reflective loss permitted under international 
investment law affect domestic corporate law, corporate govern-
ance, and the structure and corporate ownership chains of compa-
nies investing abroad.  Prior work has examined the history and 
evolution of shareholder standing under international investment 
law by exploring the practice of investment tribunals.18  Separately, 
recent policy papers have addressed theoretical concerns about the 
effects of shareholder claims for reflective loss on corporate law 
and governance.19  To my knowledge, this is the first work that 
seeks to combine corporate law and international investment law 
tools to provide a comprehensive study of shareholder claims for 
reflective loss and their impact on corporate law and governance. 
The second goal of this Article is to provide a solution to the 
problem of reflective loss claims and distortions these claims create 
on corporate law and governance choices.  The legal framework of 
reflective loss claims and the practice of arbitral tribunals suggest 
that corporate law, international law, and civil procedure rules are 
not equipped to deal with the impact of these claims on corporate 
governance and structure.  The Article makes a normative argu-
ment:  in view of the policy goals of foreign investment protection, 
shareholder claims for reflective loss should be permitted in inter-
national investment law, but only in limited circumstances to cur-
tail the disruption of corporate governance and to reduce the social 
costs of litigation.  The Article offers a private ordering solution to 
                                                                                                                   
claims had reached 767.”  Id. 
18  See, e.g., Schreuer, supra note 11, at 6–7 (detailing arbitral practice and the 
impact a shareholder’s investment has on the shareholder’s standing); Chaisse & 
Li, supra note 7, at 64 (remarking on how over the last three decades, “out of the 
more than 300 investment awards made, fourteen awards . . . explicitly ad-
dress[ed] the issue of the meaning of investment in the context of international 
disputes.”); Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations 
and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as “Investors” under Investment 
Treaties, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 387, 387 (2005) (noting how in recent years, there 
has been a “rapid increase in the number of international arbitrations between 
foreign investors and host governments.”).  
19  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 24 (explaining that the no reflective 
loss principle “is a long-standing rule primarily generated by case law.”); OECD, 
The Impact of Investment Treaties on Companies, Shareholders and Creditors, in OECD 
BUSINESS AND FINANCE OUTLOOK 223, 234–46 (2016) [hereinafter OECD Policy Pa-
per] (illustrating how the various incentives created by rules that govern the types 
of loss recoverable by shareholders affect companies, shareholders, and creditors). 
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the problem of reflective loss claims, arguing that the corporate 
distortion problem is best addressed at the level of individual cor-
porations through targeted provisions in the corporation’s govern-
ing documents—corporate charters and bylaws. 
Following this introduction, Part 2 of the Article examines re-
flective loss claims under domestic corporate and international in-
vestment law, focusing on the corporate law of the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Germany.  It also explores the concept of 
shareholder claims for reflective loss in the practice of international 
investment tribunals.  Part 3 first discusses theoretical concerns 
about the impact of reflective loss claims on corporate law and 
governance, and examines empirical evidence and case studies of 
investment disputes that have impacted corporate governance and 
structure choices of the companies investing abroad.  Based on 
these insights, it then draws lessons for the law and public policy 
on how to deal with the negative impact of reflective loss claims on 
corporate law and governance.  Part 4 explores whether interna-
tional law and civil procedure rules can restore distortions created 
by reflective loss claims and offers a private ordering solution to 
the problem of shareholder claims for reflective loss.  A short con-
clusion follows. 
 
2.  REFLECTIVE LOSS UNDER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
 
Shareholders can suffer two types of loss:  direct loss and indi-
rect, or reflective, loss.20  Shareholders incur direct loss when they 
are deprived of or restricted in their rights as shareholders, such as 
the rights to vote or to share proceeds upon dissolution of the 
company.21  Shareholders also suffer direct loss when their shares 
are cancelled22 or expropriated.23  Under most domestic law sys-
                                                   
20  See Bas J. de Jong, Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A Comparative Le-
gal Analysis, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 97, 99 (2013) (explaining that it is not always 
easy to distinguish between direct and reflective loss and to identify whether an 
exception to the “no reflective loss” principle can be applied; in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, these issues have led to the extensive case law and liter-
ature on the subject). 
21  See generally Gaukrodger, supra note 16. 
22  See Olczak v. Poland, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 239, 252 (holding that share-
holders can claim victim status if they can establish direct loss in the form of 
shares’ cancellation). 
23  See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 3 (“The damage done to the shareholder 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/5
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tems—including those of the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and the Netherlands— shareholders can recover direct 
loss by bringing a claim for losses resulting from a breach of a duty 
owed to shareholders by a third party.24 
Shareholders suffer reflective loss when there is an injury to 
“their” company that affects the company’s value or profitability, 
but the loss to the company also reflects on shareholders, for in-
stance, by decreasing the value of their shares or diminishing divi-
dend payout.25  In contrast to direct loss, shareholders generally 
cannot recover reflective loss under domestic law.  The laws of 
Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, the Neth-
erlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all follow the 
so-called “no reflective loss” principle, which prohibits sharehold-
ers from recovering reflective loss.26  Instead, corporate laws of 
these countries give the corporation the right to bring a claim for 
its (direct) loss.27  The no reflective loss principle recognizes the 
company’s autonomy and views the loss by shareholders merely as 
a reflection of the corporate loss.  Inherent within the no reflective 
loss principle is the proposition that once the corporation success-
fully recovers its loss (and replenishes its assets), the economic in-
                                                                                                                   
may affect its rights as shareholder directly, such as the expropriation of its 
shares, or the damage may be done indirectly, such as the diminution of the prof-
itability or value of the company.”). 
24  See de Jong, supra note 20, at 98–99 (explaining the definition of a loss, spe-
cifically the loss the shareholder may recover if a third party breaches duties owed 
to the company and the shareholder). 
25  See id. at 98 (“A reflective loss . . . is a decrease in the value of the share 
that corresponds to the diminution in the value of the company.”); see also 
ANDREW CHARMAN & JOHAN DU TOIT, SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS 161 (2013) (explaining 
that “loss does not only affect the company’s balance sheet, but should have, to 
some extent, the effect of a diminution of [company’s] share price or share val-
ue.”).  
26  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 1621, at 15–17 (discussing the laws of the 
United States, Canada, U.K., Germany, and France, and noting that the laws of 
Australia, China, and Hong Kong similarly adhere to the no reflective loss princi-
ple); see also Hans de Wulf, Direct Shareholder Suits for Damages Based on Reflective 
Losses, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24. AUGUST 2010: 
UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND VERANTWORTUNG 1537, 1547–48 (Stefan Grundmann et 
al. eds., 2010) (discussing the law of the Netherlands and recounting a Dutch Su-
preme Court ruling on shareholder’s rights).  
27  See de Jong, supra note 20, at 98 (detailing what a reflective loss means and 
how it relates to direct losses); see also CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161 
(describing U.K. law and noting that “a shareholder is usually not permitted to 
recover any such loss or damage [suffered at the hands of third parties] if it over-
laps with, or is reflective of, any loss suffered by the company arising out of the 
wrongdoing.”). 
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terests of shareholders will be served as well.28  Prior work has 
suggested that shareholders can benefit from “an improved share 
price or value, the payment of dividends, [and/or] the declaration 
of enhanced dividends.”29 
Despite general reluctance to compensate shareholders for re-
flective loss, domestic law recognizes that shareholder claims for 
reflective loss may sometimes be warranted; for instance, where 
the corporation ceases to exist or is unable to submit a claim.30  For 
these rare cases, domestic law provides for exceptions to the no re-
flective loss principle, allowing shareholders to bring direct claims 
for losses suffered by the company.31  The courts are cognizant of 
the conflicting interests of, on the one hand, shareholders seeking 
recovery for reflective loss, and, on the other hand, interests of the 
company, its creditors, and other stakeholders.32  In Johnson v. Gore 
Wood & Co., Lord Bingham described the balancing exercise that 
the courts perform in assessing the claims for reflective loss: 
On the one hand the court must respect the principle of 
company autonomy, ensure that the company’s creditors 
are not prejudiced by the action of individual shareholders 
and ensure that a party does not recover compensation for 
a loss which another party has suffered. On the other, the 
court must be astute to ensure that the party who has in fact 
suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied fair compensation.33 
Thus, compensation of reflective loss requires weighing the in-
                                                   
28  See CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161–62 (describing the assump-
tion behind the no reflective loss rule that “the economic interests of shareholders 
will be served by the company’s . . . recovery, by benefiting from one or more of 
an improved share price or value, the payment of dividends, or the declaration of 
enhanced dividends.”); see also Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1291 (5th 
Cir. 1989), rev’d, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (“A corporation can protect its shareholder’s 
interest by suing in the corporate name, and if the suit is successful the proceeds 
will inure to the benefit of the corporation; this increases the value of the individ-
ual shares in proportion to the amount of the recovery”).  
29  CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161–62. 
30  See, e.g., Giles v. Rhind [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1428 (Eng.) (holding that 
shareholders may submit a reflective loss claims because the company was unable 
to submit its own claims due to the defendant’s actions). 
31  See infra Part 2.1. for a discussion of corporate law of the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. 
32  See, e.g., Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66–67 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (noting how the treatment of the company and shareholder as 
one would impact the recovery of the reflective loss). 
33  Id. at 36.  
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terests of shareholders against the interests of the company and its 
creditors to identify instances where compensation of shareholders 
does not distort the principle of company autonomy or benefit 
shareholders at the expense of the company’s creditors.  
In sharp contrast to domestic corporate law, international in-
vestment law is largely blind to these concerns.  Driven by investor 
protection considerations, investment treaties allow both direct 
and indirect shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss.  As a 
result, controlling, majority, and sometimes minority shareholders 
have been able to recover reflective loss in investment arbitration, 
independently of any claims submitted by their company. 
 
2.1.  Corporate law in the United States, U.K., and Germany 
 
In the United States, the concept of “reflective loss” does not 
exist under state corporate or federal securities law.34  The taxono-
my of shareholder claims in the United States includes derivative 
actions brought by shareholders on behalf of the company (for in-
stance, corporate governance suits alleging breaches of fiduciary 
duties by management or board of directors) and direct actions 
brought by shareholders on their own behalf.  In turn, direct ac-
tions include class actions—such as mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) and securities class actions—which shareholders bring as 
representatives of other shareholders similarly injured, and indi-
vidual actions by shareholders, including actions by shareholders 
who opted out of class actions. 
In the context of derivative actions, the courts distinguish two 
types of harm:  harm suffered by the company and harm suffered 
by shareholders.  It is the harm to the company, not to sharehold-
ers, that shareholders can recover through derivative suits.35  In 
Tooley v. Donaldson, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the is-
sue of whether a stockholder’s claim is derivative or direct turns 
“solely on the following questions:  (1) who suffered the alleged 
harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and 
(2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy 
                                                   
34  See Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 57 (highlighting the way in which the 
United States handles the concept of “reflective loss”). 
35  See, e.g., Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (ex-
plaining the mechanism by which a shareholder may bring a derivative suit).  
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(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”36  The law is 
thus clear that derivative suits provide a tool for shareholders to 
sue on the company’s behalf for the harm suffered by the company 
when those in control of the corporation fail to assert a company’s 
claim.37 
The harm suffered by shareholders—both direct and reflective 
loss—is not recoverable by shareholders through derivative suits.  
To recover direct loss, a shareholder can bring an individual action 
if a duty was owed directly to the shareholder.38  Under Delaware 
law, “[t]he stockholder’s claimed direct injury must be independ-
ent of any alleged injury to the corporation.  The stockholder must 
demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder 
and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the 
corporation.”39 
With respect to reflective loss, the law generally does not pro-
vide shareholders with the right to sue.40  Instead, the law explicit-
ly prohibits shareholder claims for reflective loss largely because of 
policy considerations, such as avoidance of double recovery, exces-
sive litigation, and inconsistent and conflicting awards.  Permitting 
shareholder claims for reflective loss would allow shareholders to 
                                                   
36  Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 
2004). 
37  See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.10, at 23–24 (Supp. 2014) (citing 
Kramer, 546 A.2d at 351) (“The derivative action was developed to enable stock-
holders to sue on behalf of the corporation where those in control of the corpora-
tion refused to assert a claim belonging to it.”). 
38  See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1562 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (noting 
that where a shareholder cannot bring a derivative suit because a harm was 
caused to the shareholder, “a shareholder may still bring suit if a director violates 
a duty arising from a contract or representation owing directly to [the sharehold-
er].”). 
39  Tooley, supra note 36, at 1039. 
40  See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 15 (stating that “[a]s a general rule, only 
the company can sue to recover the loss”); see also Gaubert v. United States, 885 
F.2d 1284, 1291 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, individual shareholders have no sepa-
rate right to sue for damages suffered by the corporation which result solely in the 
diminution of the value of the corporation’s shares.” (citations omitted)); F.D.I.C., 
802 F. Supp. at 1562 (“As a matter of law, a cause of action for injury to the prop-
erty of a corporation or for destruction of its business is vested in the corporation . 
. . . A corporate shareholder has no individual cause of action for personal dam-
ages caused solely by wrong done to the corporation.” (citations omitted)); Sutter 
v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 170 P.2d 898, 900–01 (Cal. 1946) (“Generally, a stock-
holder may not maintain an action in his own behalf for a wrong done by a third 
person to the corporation on the theory that such wrong devalued his stock and 
the stock of the other shareholders . . . .”). 
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recover twice, either at the expense of the defendant (if it pays 
twice), or the company and its creditors and other stakeholders (if 
a shareholder sues and recovers first and the amount of his recov-
ery is then deducted from damages awarded to the corporation).41  
The courts have also proven to be unsympathetic to shareholder 
claimants who use the corporate entity to shield from unlimited li-
ability, but then turn around and seek to disregard the corporate 
entity to claim for reflective loss.42 
Although not allowed under domestic law, in theory share-
holder claims for reflective loss are distinguishable from other cat-
egories of shareholder claims in the United States.  First, they are 
direct suits by shareholders.  By contrast to derivate suits brought 
on behalf of the company, shareholder claims for reflective loss are 
brought by shareholders on their own behalf.  In addition, claims 
for reflective loss allow shareholders to personally recover their 
losses, instead of securing recovery to their company in derivative 
actions.  Derivate suits are also usually limited to corporate “insid-
ers”—people involved in some way in corporate governance, such 
as directors, officers, controlling shareholders.43  Derivative suits 
against third parties are generally impossible or, where they are al-
lowed, rare in practice.44  To sum up, shareholder claims for reflec-
tive loss do what the derivative suits prohibit—they allow share-
holder to bring claims against third parties, such as business 
counter-parties or host states in investment arbitration, for breach-
es of duties owned to the company.  Shareholder claims for reflec-
tive loss also differ from class actions under federal securities and 
state corporate laws in that reflective loss claims allege a breach of 
a duty owned to the company that resulted in an injury to share-
                                                   
41  See, e.g., Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 62 (“If the share-
holder is allowed to recover in respect of [reflective] loss, then either there will be 
double recovery at the expense of the defendant or the shareholder will recover at 
the expense of the company and its creditors and other shareholders.  Neither 
course can be permitted . . . .”).  But see Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 86 (arguing 
that a low risk of double recovery does not justify a bar of reflective loss because 
double recovery occurs in rare instances where “the shareholder sues first and re-
covers and then the company sues and recovers.”). 
42  See, e.g., Alford v. Frontier Enter., Inc., 599 F.2d 483, 484 (1st. Cir. 1979) 
(holding that a shareholder cannot claim reflective loss because that would sug-
gest “[the shareholder] is attempting to use the corporate form both as shield and 
sword at his will . . . .  Of course, this is impermissible.”).  
43  See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 20 (“This  regime  for  shareholder  
claims  for  reflective  loss  is  essentially  circumscribed  to  claims  against  corpo-
rate ‘insiders’.”). 
44  See id. at 19–21 (describing shareholder derivative actions generally). 
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holders.  By contrast, securities and M&A class actions allege 
breach of duties owned directly to shareholders. 
In the United Kingdom, corporate law is well familiar with the 
term “reflective loss.”45  The U.K. law generally follows the no re-
flective loss principle, but provides for several exceptions dis-
cussed below.  The no reflective loss principle as we know it today 
dates back to the case of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman In-
dustries Ltd. (No. 2).46  The Court of Appeal in Prudential held that 
the shareholder cannot recover reflective losses, explaining that: 
[W]hat [a shareholder] cannot do is to recover damages 
merely because the company in which he is interested has 
suffered damage.  He cannot recover a sum equal to the 
diminution in the market value of his shares, or equal to the 
likely diminution in dividend, because such a “loss” is 
merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company.  
The shareholder does not suffer any personal loss.  His only 
“loss” is through the company, in the diminution in the 
value of the net assets of the company . . . .47 
More recently, the House of Lords discussed the principle in its 
decision in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., where Lord Bingham sum-
marized the U.K. case law on reflective loss.48  The case suggests 
                                                   
45  See, e.g., Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 (discussing 
“reflective loss” by shareholders); Gardner v. Parker [2004] EWCA (Civ) 781 [1] 
(Eng.) (“This appeal raises, not for the first time, the ambit and limits of the rule 
against reflective loss . . . .”); see also Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (explaining that 
“[r]eflective loss is . . . the loss suffered by a shareholder where there is both 
breach of a duty owed to the company, and breach of a duty owed to the share-
holder, but the shareholder’s loss would be made good if the company enforced 
its rights against the wrongdoer . . . .”); CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161–
83 (devoting a separate chapter to non-recoverability of reflective loss under Eng-
lish company law). 
46  See generally Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (outlining the case law that has 
directed present thought on reflective loss). 
47  Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] Ch 
204 (CA) 222–23. 
48  Lord Bingham summarized the law on reflective loss as: 
(1) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, 
only the company may sue in respect of that loss.  No action lies at the 
suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a 
diminution in the value of the shareholder’s shareholding where that 
merely reflects the loss suffered by the company. . . .  [E]ven if the com-
pany . . . has declined or failed to make good that loss. . . .  (2) Where a 
company suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to recover that 
loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it (if the 
shareholder has a cause of action to do so), even though the loss is a dim-
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that under U.K. law the recovery of reflective loss will not be per-
mitted even if the company is not pursuing an independent claim; 
for instance, because the period of limitations has expired for the 
company (but not the shareholders), or the company chooses not to 
bring a claim.49  It is irrelevant that the shareholder has a separate 
cause of action, as the law prohibits recovery for reflective loss re-
gardless of the existence of a separate cause of action for the share-
holder.50  It is further irrelevant that a court could avoid double re-
covery by carefully drafting its decision.51 
The case law also provides for exceptions—or, as some com-
mentators have argued, the limits52—to the no reflective loss prin-
                                                                                                                   
inution in the value of the shareholding. . . .  (3) Where a company suf-
fers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder suffers a loss 
separate and distinct from that suffered by the company caused by 
breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each may sue 
to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it but nei-
ther may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty owed to 
that other. 
Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 35–36 (citations omitted). 
49  See id.  See also Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (summarizing the no reflective 
loss principle); CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 162–63 (discussing the case 
law on the no reflective loss principle and noting two exceptions to the basic 
proposition: “if the company refuses to recover its loss, shareholders may inter-
vene . . . by derivative action procedures; and . . . if the wrongdoer makes it im-
possible for the company to recover its loss, shareholders may be able to recover 
in respect to their own loss, even where it is reflective loss.”). 
50  The English Court of Appeal held that: 
It does not matter that [the shareholder]’s and [the company]’s causes of 
action are different.  The essential point is that [the shareholder]’s claim 
against [the defendant] is in substance a claim for compensation in re-
spect of the same loss to which [the company] has a claim against him. . . 
.  [The shareholder’s] loss will be made good if the wronged company, 
which has the primary claim, enforces in full its claims against the 
wrongdoer. 
Gardner v. Parker [2003] EWHC (Ch) 1463 [41] (Eng.).  
51  Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (“[T]he existence of the rule is justified by the 
need both to prevent double recovery and to provide protection for the compa-
ny’s creditors, who might be prejudiced if the shareholder’s claim were to suc-
ceed.”). 
52  Joffe & Mather have argued that exceptions to the no reflective loss princi-
ple are in fact the limits on the no reflective loss principle.  The authors have ex-
plained: 
Where the defendant owes a duty to the shareholder but not to the com-
pany, or where the shareholder’s loss is separate and distinct, the no re-
flective loss principle has no application at all.  They are not situations in 
which duties are owed to both company and the shareholder, and the 
shareholder’s loss is reflective, but it is nonetheless permitted to sue to 
recover that loss. 
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ciple under U.K. law.  First, a shareholder can bring a claim for re-
flective loss under U.K. law if the company has no cause of action 
to recover its loss.53  Second, a shareholder can bring a claim for re-
flective loss if the “breach of duty was owed to [the shareholder] 
personally; and . . . [their loss was] separate and distinct from the 
loss suffered by the company.”54  Third, the Court of Appeal in 
Giles v. Rhind—where Lord Justice Walker allowed a shareholder to 
claim for reflective loss where the defendant (the wrongdoer) disa-
bled the company from pursuing that cause of action—identified 
an additional exception under U.K law.55  The Giles v. Rhind excep-
tion allowed for the consideration of the impact of a defendant’s 
conduct in determining a shareholder’s standing to assert a claim 
for reflective loss. 
Prior work has shown that civil law jurisdictions, such as Ger-
many, France, and the Netherlands, similarly prohibit shareholder 
claims for reflective loss.56  Among these countries, Germany ad-
heres to the strongest version of the no reflective loss principle,57 
usually banning shareholder recovery for reflective loss.  De Wulf 
has discussed an important decision by the German Bun-
desgerichtshof (BGH) of November 10, 1986, where the court reject-
ed a shareholder claim for reflective loss because “this would run 
counter to the principle of capital maintenance . . . and would be 
incompatible with the fact that company property or assets are 
earmarked for a specific goal, namely the company’s purpose . . . 
.”58  According to the BGH, the shareholder could claim for “sepa-
                                                                                                                   
Id. 
53  See Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 (“The test is not 
whether the company could have made a claim in respect of the loss in question; 
the question is whether, treating the company and the shareholder as one for this 
purpose, the shareholder’s loss is franked by that of the company.”). 
54  CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 174. 
55  See Giles v. Rhind [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1428 (Eng.); see also Victor Joffe & 
James Mather, The Vanishing Exception Part Two: Victor Joffe & James Mather Contin-
ue Their Reflections on Controversial Cases on Ability to Pay, NEW L.J., Dec. 5, 2008, 
https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/vanishing-exception-0 
[https://perma.cc/49J8-7BLL] (describing the facts and outcome of Giles v. Rhind 
in detail). 
56  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 17–18 (discussing Germany and 
France); see also de Jong, supra note 20, at 99 (“The basic rule in most jurisdictions, 
including the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, is that a share-
holder cannot recover a loss which is simply reflective of the company’s loss.”). 
57  See de Jong, supra note 20, at 107 (“German law strictly adheres to the ‘no 
reflective loss’ principle.”). 
58  de Wulf, supra note 26, at 1545. 
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rate, direct damage,” but not for reflective loss resulting from the 
injury to the company.59  Similarly, in France, a shareholder can on-
ly claim for “personal injury” that is independent from the injury 
suffered by the company.60  The French courts have dismissed 
shareholder claims where the injury to shareholder was only corol-
lary to the injury of the company.61 
Consequently, most advanced systems of corporate law unan-
imously prohibit shareholder claims for reflective loss, allowing 
only limited exceptions to the no reflective loss principle.  For most 
domestic systems of law—including the legal systems of the Unit-
ed Kingdom, the United States, and Germany—it is irrelevant 
whether the shareholder has a separate cause of action, as these le-
gal systems prohibit shareholder claims for reflective loss in either 
case.62  In general, it appears that the nature of the loss—reflective 
loss to shareholders resulting from a direct loss to the company—
largely determines the prohibition of the recovery, regardless of a 
separate cause of action by shareholders. 
The no reflective loss principle does, however, have weakness-
es.  First, the principle is based on the assumption that the compa-
ny will be able to bring its own claim.  Further, it assumes that 
once the company recovers its losses, the shareholders will recover 
indirectly.  For instance, the indirect recovery may occur through 
dividend payout; but, it is unclear whether this payout would re-
store the economic interests of the shareholders and, consequently, 
put shareholders in a position they would have found themselves 
in if the loss had never occurred.  Furthermore, even if the share 
price or value is restored, this would not provide recovery to 
shareholders that sold their shares at a lower price prior to recov-
ery by the company. 
Despite these concerns, the no reflective loss principle is com-
monly accepted as a practical and fair solution.  It is also supported 
by sound policy considerations, such as the avoidance of double 
recovery, increase of judicial economy, and consistency and pre-
dictability of court decisions.63  And so, in unusual unison, both ef-
                                                   
59  Id. 
60  See id. at 1557–61 (discussing French law). 
61  See id. at 1559 (explaining that shareholder suffering because of dropped 
stocks is actually a corollary to damage suffered by the company). 
62  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining that Germany and 
France typically do not allow shareholders to make claims for reflective loss). 
63  See id. at 7 (“Courts in advanced systems of national corporate law, how-
ever, generally reject shareholder claims for reflective loss—largely for explicit 
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ficiency and fairness concerns dictate the no reflective loss princi-
ple, barring shareholders from claiming reflective loss under do-
mestic corporate law.64 
 
2.2.  International investment law:  Treaties and the practice of arbitral 
tribunals 
 
In international investment law, the concept of shareholder 
standing has developed through the practice of arbitral tribunals 
called upon to interpret investment treaty provisions as part of in-
vestor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”).  Historically, shareholders 
that invested abroad could only seek protection through the cus-
tomary international law of diplomatic protection.  Similar to do-
mestic law, customary international law distinguishes between di-
rect and reflective loss and generally granted protection to 
shareholders only for direct loss.65  The role of customary interna-
tional law has diminished over time with the growth of investor 
protection treaties, which largely replaced customary international 
law in the area of investment protection.66 
Today, there are over 3,300 international investment agree-
ments (IIAs) that provide foreign investors with various investor 
protections— such as non-discrimination, fair and equitable treat-
ment (FET), and full protection and security (FPS)—and may also 
contain the state’s consent to arbitration.67  Treaties protect various 
                                                                                                                   
policy reasons relating to consistency, predictability, avoidance of double recov-
ery, and judicial economy.”).  
64 See id. at 3 (“Limiting recovery to the company [under domestic law] is 
seen as both more efficient and fairer to all interested parties.”). 
65  See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judg-
ment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 88 (Feb. 5) (“[W]here it is a question of an unlawful act 
committed against a company representing foreign capital, the general rule of in-
ternational law authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a 
claim.”); see also Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 20 (providing examples from Ger-
man, French, U.K. and Japanese law). 
66  See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 45 (July 17, 2003) 
(“To some extent, diplomatic protection is intervening as a residual mechanism to 
be resorted to in the absence of other arrangements recognizing the direct right of 
action by individuals.  It is precisely this kind of arrangement that has come to 
prevail under international law . . . .”). 
67  See UNCTAD 2017 REPORT, supra note 17, at xii (“In 2016, 37 new IIAs 
were concluded, bringing the total number of treaties to 3,324 by year-end . . . .”).  
But see id. (“Over the same time, terminations of at least 19 IIAs became effective, 
with more to come.”). 
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forms of investments and may cover shares, stock, and other forms 
of equity participation in the company.  Reflecting the treaty prac-
tice, arbitral tribunals have consistently allowed shareholders in 
investment arbitrations to bring claims for reflective loss since 
1970.68  In doing so, the tribunals have sought guidelines from the 
terms of investment treaties and, in the words of the Teinver v. Ar-
gentina tribunal, have “refus[ed] to take the cues from domestic 
corporate law,”69 which generally prohibits reflective loss claims.  
Where treaties protect foreign investments in equity securities, it is 
settled law today that shareholders have independent standing 
under IIAs to bring individual claims for losses suffered by the 
company.70 
Arbitral tribunals examine shareholding issues at the beginning 
of an arbitration to establish whether a tribunal has the right to 
hear a claim71—the jurisdictional approach—or whether a claim by 
                                                   
68  See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 4 (“[P]ractice since 1970, the year of the deci-
sion in Barcelona Traction, demonstrates an increasing willingness to grant an in-
dependent standing to shareholders.”); see also CMS Gas Transmission Company 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Ju-
risdiction, ¶ 48 (July 17, 2003) (“The Tribunal therefore finds no bar in current in-
ternational law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders independently 
from those of the corporation concerned, not even if those shareholders are minor-
ity or non-controlling shareholders.”).  See generally Alexandrov, supra note 18 (re-
viewing early arbitral tribunal practice that affirmed the status of shareholders as 
investors under investment treaties). 
69  Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 212 (Dec. 21, 2012). 
70  See, e.g., Enron v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction, ¶ 39 (Jan. 14, 2004) (noting that “there is nothing contrary to 
international law or the ICSID Convention in upholding the concept that share-
holders may claim independently from the corporation concerned, even if those 
shareholders are not in the majority or in control of the company.”). 
71  Arbitral tribunals and scholars disagree as to whether the shareholder 
standing constitutes an issue of jurisdiction or, instead, of admissibility of a claim.  
The distinction between the issues of admissibility and jurisdiction is not always 
easy to draw. Crawford distinguishes the two concepts as follows: 
Objections to jurisdiction relate to conditions affecting the parties’ con-
sent to have the tribunal decide the case at all . . . .  An objection to the 
admissibility of a claim invites the tribunal to dismiss (or perhaps post-
pone) the claim on a ground which, while it does not exclude its authori-
ty in principle, affects the possibility or propriety of its deciding the par-
ticular case at the particular time. 
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 693 (8th 
ed. 2012). 
As a result, there is “a degree of confusion and indifference in international in-
vestment law” as to the difference between these two concepts.  Tania Voon et al., 
Legal Responses to Corporate Manoeuvring in International Investment Arbitration, 5 J. 
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a shareholder can be brought in arbitration—the admissibility ap-
proach.  Once arbitral tribunals identify the first entity or a physi-
cal person that has standing in investment arbitration, they usually 
end their jurisdictional analysis and proceed to the merits of a 
claim.72  The tribunals also look at shareholding at the end of the 
arbitration to calculate damages.73  By contrast to the jurisdictional 
phase, investment tribunals tend to be more open to the double re-
covery concerns74 and have been known to award damages to 
shareholders in proportion to the shareholders’ shares of equity.75 
For shareholders seeking to bring a claim in investor-state arbi-
tration, two questions become determinative.  First, what consti-
tutes an investment under a treaty and, in particular, do protected 
investments under a treaty include stock or other interest in the 
company?  Second, who can bring a claim under an investor pro-
tection treaty?  Answering these questions requires treaty interpre-
tation by an arbitral tribunal and would ultimately determine 
whether a tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a dispute involving a 
particular investment activity or an investor. 
Arbitral tribunals interpret treaties by giving the treaties’ terms 
                                                                                                                   
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 41, 45 (2014). 
72  See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 325 (2008) 
(noting that there is “the tendency of tribunals to end the jurisdictional analysis 
once they identify an entity with standing.”); see also CMS Gas Transmission v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Juris-
diction, ¶¶ 84, 86 (July 17, 2003) (finding Argentina’s argument that it is not nec-
essarily true that CMS may claim compensation for Argentina’s actions propor-
tionate to its share in TGN because it is not guaranteed that this compensation 
would reach TGN’s shareholders was irrelevant for the jurisdiction). 
73  See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 
456 (2009) (citing arbitral awards where the tribunals analyzed shareholding to 
calculate damages). 
74  See, e.g., Gemplus, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/3, Award, ¶¶ 12–60 (June 16, 2010) (explaining that shareholder 
claimants insisted that their claim was “jurisdictionally distinct and wholly sepa-
rate” from the company’s claim for damages in the host state’s domestic courts, 
but the tribunal “[n]evertheless . . . appreciate[d] the concern that, in practical 
terms, they may be seen as recovering compensation for the same acts through 
separate sets of proceedings.”). 
75  See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 620 (Mar. 14, 2003) (finding that an arbitral tribunal 
awarded damages to the claimant in proportion to the claimant’s direct share-
holding of 93.2% in the investment, but in awarding damages disregarded an ad-
ditional share of 5.8% held indirectly by the claimant); see also Eskosol, supra note 
9, ¶ 170 n.294 (“Had Italy instead not prevailed in the prior proceeding . . . the 
Tribunal of course would have to be vigilant to prevent double recovery from Ita-
ly for the same loss. Because of the outcome of the Blusun case, however, that situ-
ation does not arise here.”). 
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their ordinary meaning in view of the treaties’ respective object 
and purpose.76  Yet, most investment treaties are inherently vague 
and provide little or no clarification as to what constitutes an in-
vestment under the treaty.  As a result, interpretations by arbitral 
tribunals vary substantially across treaties and disputes.  In the ab-
sence of the doctrine of stare decisis or binding precedents in inter-
national investment law, tribunals may also interpret identical trea-
ty provisions differently in subsequent arbitrations. 
 
2.2.1.  Shareholding as investment 
 
First-generation bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”)—the 
most common form of IIAs—were relatively short.  Such treaties 
sought to increase inward investments and granted protection 
largely to foreign direct investments (FDIs), which—by contrast to 
two other categories of investments, portfolio and indirect invest-
ments—entail a lasting relationship with a certain degree of control 
or influence over investments.77  BITs provided very little guidance 
as to what constitutes an investment, leaving it to the arbitral tri-
bunals to identify whether protection is warranted under a particu-
lar treaty.  The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States78 (the ICSID 
                                                   
76  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose”).  For instance, arbitral tribunals have allowed 
claims by both direct and indirect shareholders because BITs generally do not dis-
tinguish between direct and indirect investments.  See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137 
(Aug. 3, 2004) (“The Tribunal observes that there is no explicit reference to direct 
or indirect investment as such in the [Treaty between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investments].  The definition of ‘investment’ is very broad.”). 
77  See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION MANUAL 99 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter IMF 
POSITION MANUAL] (“Direct investment is related to control or a significant degree 
of influence, and tends to be associated with a lasting relationship. As well as 
funds, direct investors may supply additional contributions such as know-how, 
technology, management, and marketing.”). 
78  See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States (the Washington Convention), Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (establishing 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
providing facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes be-
tween contracting states and nationals of other contracting states). 
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Convention), adopted in 1965, offers largely a procedural mecha-
nism of investor-state dispute resolution.  The ICSID Convention 
does not address the scope of protected investments and/or inves-
tors.  Its only reference to investments is found in Article 25(1), 
which limits the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to “any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment.”79  Therefore, the ICSID Convention 
leaves it to sovereign states to specify in their treaties or investment 
agreements what constitutes an investment with respect to which a 
state agrees to arbitration under the ICSID Convention.  Similarly, 
there are no references to investments or investors in other arbitra-
tion rules commonly used in ISDS, such as the UNCITRAL arbitra-
tion rules.80 
In this legal vacuum, scholars and arbitral tribunals sought to 
establish certain criteria for distinguishing FDIs from other catego-
ries of investments.  Notably, following the decision in Salini,81 tri-
bunals incorporated the typical “features” identified by Schreuer 
for investments under the ICSID Convention into the Convention’s 
jurisdictional requirements.82  And so, in ICSID arbitrations, the 
tribunals granted protection to investments that satisfied all of the 
so-called Salini-Schreuer factors, which are:  (a) a certain duration, 
(b) a certain regularity of profit and return, (c) the assumption of 
risk by both sides, (d) substantial commitment of capital, and (e) 
significance of the operation for the host state’s development.83  
Applied cumulatively, these stringent criteria provided little defer-
ence to the state parties’ own determination of what constituted an 
                                                   
79  Id. art. 25(1). 
80  See generally UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2011), 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-
rules-revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TYK-F387]. 
81  Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) (“The doctrine generally 
considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance 
of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction . . . .  In reading 
the Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic devel-
opment of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.”). 
82  See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux 
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 257, 273 
(2010) (explaining that arbitral tribunals have gone even further than Salini by 
“requiring each of [Schreuer’s ‘typical features’ of investments] to be satisfied in 
some objective measure, rather than allowing for some totality-of-the-
circumstances balancing among the factors.”). 
83  See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 140, 
¶ 122 (2001) (defining “investment” based on ICSID’s history”). 
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investment under the treaty.  These criteria also limited protection 
for portfolio investments,84 such as investments in equity and debt 
securities, largely because portfolio investments do not provide an 
investor with control over the company, unless the case involves a 
controlling or a majority shareholder.  Furthermore, beyond the 
amounts invested in actual shares, portfolio investments generally 
do not entail sharing of risk between an investor (a shareholder) 
and a host state.  Finally, such investments can be of a short dura-
tion, which does not warrant protection under the Salini-Schreuer 
factors.85 
The need to satisfy the Salini-Schreuer criteria has subsided over 
time as the new generation of BITs have come into force.  These 
treaties have explicitly extended protection to portfolio investments 
(such as stock and bonds) and indirect investments (such as agree-
ments on technical assistance, intellectual property transfers, and 
joint marketing arrangements).86  Today, most modern IIAs would 
consider holding shares in companies that have made investments 
abroad or being a foreign shareholder in the local companies estab-
lished in the host state to be protected investment activities.  A typ-
ical example is Article 1 of the U.S. Model BIT, which defines “in-
vestment” as: 
[E]very asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, in-
                                                   
84  See IMF POSITION MANUAL, supra note 77, at 99 (outlining the functional 
categories of investment and distinguishing portfolio investors from direct inves-
tors).  There are different dynamics at work in cases of portfolio investments as 
compared to FDIs.  As the IMF explains: 
“[P]ortfolio investors typically have less of a role in the decision making 
of the enterprise with potentially important implications for future flows 
and for the volatility of the price and volume of positions.  Portfolio in-
vestment differs from other investment in that it provides a direct way to 
access financial markets, and thus it can provide liquidity and flexibility.  
It is associated with financial markets and with their specialized service 
providers, such as exchanges, dealers, and regulators.”  
Id. 
85  Investment treaties generally do not contain a minimum duration re-
quirement for a foreign investment to receive protection under a treaty, although 
the Salini tribunal suggested a 2-year threshold.  See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. 
Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 54 
(July 23, 2001) (The transaction, therefore, complies with the minimal length of 
time . . . which is from 2 to 5 years). 
86  See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1–2 (defining three broad categories of 
cross-border investments as commonly described in international investment 
law). 
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cluding such characteristics as the commitment of capital or 
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the as-
sumption of risk.87 
The article further provides a non-exclusive list of forms that an 
investment may take, including:  (a) an enterprise; (b) shares, stock, 
and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; (c) bonds, 
debentures, other debt instruments, and loans.88 
Similar provisions that extend the benefits of investment trea-
ties to shareholders can be found in the majority of known IIAs.  
According to the Mapping Project of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), out of 2,577 IIAs in-
cluded in the project, only 25 treaties exclude portfolio investments 
from their coverage.89  Although the project does not yet cover all 
known IIAs, one can clearly observe that the majority of modern 
investment treaties specifically provide for—or at least do not ex-
clude—protection of investments in the stock of the company. 
 
2.2.2.  Shareholder claims for reflective loss 
 
Although many IIAs list shares as a type of investment, in-
vestment treaties generally do not talk about shares or shareholder 
rights beyond that.90  In particular, investment treaties do not tend 
to identify what kind of claims shareholders can bring in invest-
                                                   
87  U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1 
(2012), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PL8T-4ZQW]. 
88  See id. (providing definitions).  The model treaty recognizes the diverse 
nature of debt and attempts to distinguish debt that warrants investment protec-
tion from other types of debt.  Footnote 1 to Article 1 explains that “[s]ome forms 
of debt . . . are more likely to have the characteristics of an investment, while other 
forms of debt, such as claims to payment that are immediately due and result 
from the sale of goods or services, are less likely to have such characteristics.”  Id. 
n.1. 
89  See generally UNCTAD, IIA Mapping Project, INV. POL’Y HUB, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent 
[https://perma.cc/PXJ5-ELYB] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).  UNCTAD describes 
its IIA Mapping Project as “a collaborative initiative between UNCTAD and uni-
versities worldwide to map the content of IIAs. The resulting database serves as a 
tool to understand trends in IIA drafting, assess the prevalence of different policy 
approaches and identify treaty examples.”  Id. 
90  See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 8 (“Typically, the only reference to 
shares in BITs is a clause that clarifies that shares are assets that qualify as an in-
vestment under the treaty definition of investment.”). 
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ment arbitration.91  Despite concise treaty provisions, tribunals 
have consistently interpreted IIAs to allow shareholder claims for 
reflective loss, and the number of such arbitrations continue to 
grow.92  Gaukrodger has observed that “[c]laims by company 
shareholders seeking damages from government for so-called ‘re-
flective loss’ now make up a substantial part of the [investor-state 
dispute settlement] caseload.”93 
Unlike domestic courts that focus on the type of loss suffered 
by shareholders and prohibit shareholder claims if the loss is re-
flective of the company’s loss, arbitral tribunals focus their inquiry 
on the availability of a cause of action for shareholders.  Once they 
are satisfied that a shareholder has been granted protection under 
a treaty, they allow the case to proceed without regard to the type 
of loss suffered by the shareholder.  Having established liability, 
tribunals award damages to shareholders directly, usually on a pro 
rata basis to the company’s loss.94 
Moreover, it is largely irrelevant for shareholder standing 
whether a company can submit its claim in ISDS.95  The tribunals 
view the claims by shareholders as autonomous from the claims by 
the company and generally allow both types of claims to proceed.96  
In this respect, tribunals have indicated that the interests of share-
                                                   
91  See id. (noting that most treaties do not “expressly address the issue of the 
scope of shareholder claims.”). 
92  See id. at 7 (“A rough count suggests that there are easily more than 40 de-
cisions involving shareholder claims and numerous pending cases, many of 
which involve claims for reflective loss.”). 
93  Id. 
94  As Gaukrodger explains: 
The consequence is three outcomes with regard to shareholder claims 
that contrast with domestic law. First, shareholders have generally been 
able to claim for reflective loss in ISDS whereas such shareholder claims 
are generally barred in national law. Second, ISDS tribunals have award-
ed recovery of reflective loss to shareholders rather than to the company 
as under domestic law shareholder derivative action procedures (which 
exceptionally allow shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss, but 
with recovery for the company). Third, ISDS tribunals have found share-
holder claims for reflective loss to be autonomous from those of the 
company in ISDS so that both claims can co-exist; this cannot occur un-
der general domestic law principles. 
Id. at 8. 
95  Cf. id. at 29 (citing arbitrations where companies had recourse to claims in 
ISDS, yet their shareholders were also allowed to proceed in arbitration). 
96  See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 166 (“A shareholder’s claim for its reflec-
tive loss through an entity in which it holds shares cannot be equated automatical-
ly to that entity’s claim for its direct losses.”). 
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holders and the company are rarely identical to the extent that it is 
abusive to allow both arbitrations to proceed.97  For instance, inter-
ests of the shareholder and the company may be found to be iden-
tical where a foreign shareholder owns 100% of equity in a local 
company.98 
Provisions of BITs and other IIAs establish who may bring a 
claim in arbitration with a focus on the nationality requirements.  
As a general rule, the claimant must be a national of the State party 
to the treaty and may not be a national of the host state.99  For in-
stance, under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, a foreign investor can submit 
a claim to arbitration on its own behalf (Article 1116), or on behalf 
of an enterprise—a juridical person established in the host State 
that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly (Article 
1117).100  Article 1117(3) further provides that if claims are made 
both on behalf of an investor and an enterprise and they arise from 
the same events, such claims have to be generally heard together 
by the arbitral tribunal.101  Thus, NAFTA Chapter 11 attempts to 
achieve greater consistency and judicial economy by providing for 
consolidation of arbitrations. 
In addition, some treaties allow an investment to initiate an arbi-
tration directly.102  Under most of these treaties, an “investment” is 
a company that is incorporated in the host state to carry out in-
                                                   
97  See id. ¶ 167 (noting that the interests of the shareholders and the company 
can be identical such that it would be abusive to “permit arbitration of a given 
dispute by one after the other already has concluded an arbitration over the same 
dispute.”). 
98  See id. (“In the Tribunal’s view, the same conclusion would be equally log-
ical in the reverse situation, if a first case were brought by the 100% shareholders 
of a local company and thereafter a second case was attempted by the local com-
pany that they wholly owned.”). 
99  See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 2 (“The claimants in investment arbitration 
must meet certain requirement with respect to their nationality.  Most important-
ly, they must not be nationals of the host State.”). 
100  See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1116–17, 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992) [hereinafter NAFTA] (noting methods through 
which investors can submit claims to arbitration). 
101  See id. art. 1117(3) (“Where an investor makes a claim under this Article 
and the investor or a non-controlling investor in the enterprise makes a claim un-
der Article 1116 . . . the claims should be heard together by a Tribunal established 
under Article 1126, unless the Tribunal finds that the interests of a disputing party 
would be prejudiced thereby.”). 
102  U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes Aris-
ing from Investment Treaties: A Review, 15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4 
(2005) (defining “investor” and “investment”).  But see NAFTA, supra note 100, 
art. 1117(4) (“An investment may not make a claim under this Section [B. Settle-
ment of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party].”). 
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vestment activity, as required by law or business considerations.103  
Although these are local companies that are generally not expected 
to benefit from investment treaties, they may be granted protec-
tions if such companies are under foreign control.104  Arbitral tri-
bunals have interpreted these provisions with “some flexibility,”105 
consistently allowing local companies under foreign control to act 
as claimants, irrespective of any claims by the controlling share-
holders.106 
                                                   
103  See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 620 (noting that where “the company has 
the nationality of the host State and does not qualify as a foreign investor. . . . the 
company in question is not treated as the investor but as the investment.”); id. at 4 
(observing that “many States require the establishment of a local company as a 
precondition for foreign investment.”); see also Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Deci-
sion on Annulment, ¶ 50 (July 3, 2002), 19 ICSID Rev. 89 (2004) (“While the for-
eign shareholding is by definition an ‘investment’ and its holder an ‘investor,’ the 
local company only falls within the scope of Article 1 [of the France-Argentina 
BIT] if it is ‘effectively controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of one Con-
tracting Party’ or by corporations established under its laws.”).  Sometimes, estab-
lishment of the local company is motivated purely by business considerations.  
See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 49 (noting that where there was no requirement 
under Italian law to establish a local company, but a foreign investor chose to do it 
for business reasons). 
104  Article 25(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention permits the host state and the 
foreign investor to agree that a locally incorporated company should be treated as 
a foreign company because of its foreign control.  See ICSID Convention, supra 
note 78, art. 25(2)(b) (providing in relevant part that “‘National of another Con-
tracting State’ means: . . . any juridical person which had the nationality of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute . . . and which, because of foreign control, 
the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting 
State for the purposes of this Convention.”); see also The Energy Charter Treaty 
art. 26(7), Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter ECT] (providing in relevant 
part that an investment “controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party . . . 
[shall] be treated as a ‘national of another State.’”).  Thus, provided there is 
agreement between the parties, the foreign control requirement allows departure 
from the principles of incorporation or seat of the company, which are commonly 
applied under international investment law to determine the nationality of the 
corporation.  Cf. Schreuer, supra note 11, at 17 (“Under the ICSID Convention, de-
parture from the principle of incorporation or siège social in favour of foreign con-
trol to determine corporate nationality is permissible only under the narrowly cir-
cumscribed conditions of Article 25(2)(b).”).  Some tribunals may also apply the 
equitable doctrine of “veil piercing” to identify the true nationality of the party.  
See, e.g., Alexandrov, supra note 18, at 402 (opining that a tribunal could pierce the 
veil only where the company’s conduct “constitute[s] an abuse of legal personali-
ty” and there is evidence that the company “used its formal legal nationality for 
[an] improper purpose.” (citation omitted)). 
105  Schreuer, supra note 11, at 5. 
106  See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 15, 17 (Sept. 25, 1983) (asserting jurisdic-
tion over claims against Indonesia by both PT Amco, a local Indonesian company, 
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Furthermore, arbitral tribunals have allowed both direct and 
indirect shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss.  In doing 
so, tribunals rely on investment treaty provisions, which are usual-
ly broad and do not distinguish between direct and indirect in-
vestments.  Without an express exclusion of indirect shareholders, 
arbitral tribunals have demonstrated certain reluctance to deny ju-
risdiction to indirect investments.107  As a result, it is increasingly 
hard to predict if a tribunal will be willing to cut some of the po-
tential claimants depending on a degree of remoteness from an in-
vestment. 
The openness of ISDS to claims by indirect shareholders in-
creases the multiplicity of claims in ISDS, especially because the 
pool of potential claimants expands beyond a local company (an 
“investment”) and its direct shareholders.108  The potential scenari-
os of how investments and claims can be structured are unlimited.  
They can involve shareholders of one or more intermediaries in the 
investor’s home state, the host state or third countries, at several 
levels of corporate ownership structure.109  Arbitral tribunals have 
                                                                                                                   
and Amco Asia, its controlling shareholder). 
107  See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137 (Aug. 3, 2004) (denying Argentina’s objection to 
jurisdiction arising from the claimant’s indirect shareholding in the Argentine in-
vestment because “there is no explicit reference to direct or indirect investment as 
such in the [Germany-Argentina bilateral investment] Treaty.  The definition of 
‘investment’ is very broad . . . .  Therefore, a literal reading of the Treaty does not 
support the allegation [by Argentina] that the definition of investment excludes 
indirect investment.”). 
108  Schreuer, supra note 11, at 11 (observing that “[i]f there are two or more 
layers of minority shareholding the economic consequence of the adverse action 
by the host State may still be traceable.  But the pursuit of legal remedies becomes 
increasingly complex especially if competing sets of shareholders at different lev-
els pursue parallel or conflicting remedies.”). 
109  Schreuer points to a complex structure of investment in Enron v. Argenti-
na, where the claimants indirectly owned 35.263% of the investments in Argenti-
na.  See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 12 (describing investment structure).  The 
shareholding was described as follows: 
Claimants’ participation concerns the privatization of Transportadora de 
Gas del Sur (“TGS”), one of the major networks for the transportation 
and distribution of gas produced in the provinces of the South of Argen-
tina.  The Claimants own 50% of the shares of CIESA, an Argentine in-
corporated company that controls TGS by owning 55.30% of its shares; 
the Claimants’ participation in CIESA is held by two wholly-owned 
companies, EPCA and EACH.  The Claimants, through EPCA, EACH 
and ECIL, another corporation controlled by the Claimants, also own 
75.93% of EDIDESCA, another Argentine corporation that owns 10% of 
the shares of TGS; and they also have acquired an additional 0.02% of 
TGS through EPCA. The investment as a whole, it is explained, amounts 
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acknowledged the problem, but continue to grant jurisdiction as 
long as a treaty allows shareholder protection without reserva-
tions.110 
Consequently, reflective loss claims under international in-
vestment law largely raise the same concerns that motivated do-
mestic courts to adopt the no reflective loss principle:  double re-
covery, increased cost of litigation, and conflicting awards.111  
Arbitral tribunals have acknowledged these concerns and ex-
pressed sympathy to the host states’ circumstances,112 yet they con-
tinue faithfully to enforce IIAs by permitting claims by sharehold-
ers independently of claims by local companies.113 
                                                                                                                   
to 35.263% of TGS. 
Enron v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, ¶ 21 (Jan. 14, 2004). 
110  See, e.g., id. ¶ 50 (raising concern that “if minority shareholders can claim 
independently from the affected corporation, this could trigger an endless chain 
of claims, as any shareholder . . . could invoke a direct right of action for measures 
affecting a corporation at the end of the chain.”); id. ¶ 52 (“The Tribunal notes that 
. . . there is indeed a need to establish a cut-off point beyond which claims would 
not be permissible as they would have only a remote connection to the affected 
company.”).  But see Schreuer, supra note 11, at 14 (criticizing the tribunal’s sug-
gestion to find a cut-off, stating that “[t]he Tribunal’s demand for a cut-off point 
for indirect shareholding lacks a legal foundation.  Any difficulties arising from a 
multiplicity of claimants can be taken care of by a number of devices but do not 
require that the investor be deprived of its standing.”). 
111  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 9 (observing that “[s]hareholder 
claims are likely to be less predictable for governments than claims by the injured 
company because company nationality is both known and hard to change; in con-
trast, the identity of shareholders is both more likely to change and frequently 
hard to monitor.”). 
112  See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 170 (“The tribunal is not unsympathetic 
to Italy’s circumstances . . . .  [I]t would not be appropriate for tribunals to pre-
clude arbitration by qualified investors, simply because other qualified investors 
may have proceeded before them without their participation.”).  
113  See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 249 (citing American Mfg. & Trad-
ing v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb 21, 1997); Genin 
v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 324 (June 25, 2001)) (discussing 
cases where the protected foreign investments were shares in domestic compa-
nies); see also CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001); Antoineé Goetz v. Republic of Burun-
di, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Decision (Sept. 2, 1998), 15 ICSID Rev. 457 (2000); 
Emilio Augustín Maffezzini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 212 (2001); Compañía de 
Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment (July 3, 2002); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 8, 2003); 
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision 
of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Apr. 30, 2004); Plama Con-
sortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Juris-
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By contrast to their treatment of the host states, arbitral tribu-
nals have shown little sympathy to multinational corporations 
whose shareholders submit reflective loss claims in ISDS.  Most 
tribunals focus on the enforcement of investment treaties and do 
not discuss distortions that reflective loss claims create on corpo-
rate law and governance within the corporation.114  Arbitral tribu-
nals have not been sensitive to these concerns and instead have ac-
cepted shareholder claims and established jurisdiction even where 
it would harm the corporation—for instance, because it would de-
stroy the management efforts to settle with a host state.115  Only a 
few tribunals have acknowledged the problem, suggesting that 
disputes between the shareholders and the company resulting 
from their competing interests in investment arbitrations can be 
addressed under domestic law.116  Other tribunals have dismissed 
any concerns over competing interests between the company and 
its treaty-protected shareholders, presumably leaving it for the 
company and the shareholders to resolve their disputes between 
themselves. 
By contrast to domestic courts that focus on the nature of 
shareholder loss and reject claims for reflective loss, investment 
tribunals have focused on the cause of action.  Once they establish 
that a shareholder has the right to claim for reflective loss under a 
treaty, tribunals establish jurisdiction regardless of the reflective 
nature of the shareholder loss.117  Arbitral tribunals explain their 
                                                                                                                   
diction (Feb. 8, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 262 (2005). 
114  See, e.g., Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 80 (Aug. 25, 2006) (“Having found, how-
ever, that the assets and rights that Total claims have been injured in breach of the 
BIT fall under the definition of investments under the BIT, it is immaterial that 
they belong to Argentine companies in accordance with the law of Argentina.”). 
115  See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 
456 (2009) (describing instances where tribunals “hearing claims by shareholders 
have proclaimed as irrelevant the fact that the company is actively negotiating 
with the host state to achieve a settlement.”). 
116  See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 170 (holding that it was not a “sufficient 
basis for precluding qualified investors from exercising their fundamental right to 
access the ICSID system,” even where domestic law affords “potential remedies—
for example, claims by minority shareholders or bankruptcy receivers against ma-
jority shareholders who take unauthorized actions in contravention of domestic 
law.”). 
117  See, e.g., RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 
V079/2005, Final Award, ¶ 608 (Sep. 12, 2010) (noting that “investment treaty ar-
bitration does not require that a shareholder can only claim protection in respect 
of measures that directly affect shares in their own right, but that the investor can 
also claim protection for the effect on its shares by measures of the host state taken 
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position by express provisions of investor protection treaties, 
which permit shareholder claims for reflective loss irrespective of 
the legal nature and status of foreign investors under domestic 
law.  Scholars have expressed their support to such arbitral tribu-
nals’ practice.118  Considering the text of existing IIAs and decisions 
by investment tribunals interpreting such treaties, one can clearly 
observe that—in international investment law—concerns about 
foreign investor protection prevail over concerns over double re-
covery, conflicting awards, and judicial economy, the justifications 
for the “no reflective loss” principle under domestic law.119 
 
3.  REFLECTIVE LOSS AND CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
3.1.  Theoretical predictions 
 
Courts and commentators have suggested that the no reflective 
loss principle under domestic corporate law is based on policy 
considerations.120  In other words, domestic law does not provide 
shareholders with the right to bring a claim for reflective loss not 
because the law does not recognize shareholder’s injury, but be-
cause the law finds it more efficient and more fair to give a right to 
claim for injury to the company.121  Most frequently, such policy 
                                                                                                                   
against the company.”). 
118  See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE , & MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶¶ 6.77, 6.79 
(2007) (“[T]here is no conceptual reason to prevent an investor recovering for 
damage caused to those shares which has resulted in a diminution in their value . 
. . .  The simplest approach to justify claims [for reflective loss] is . . . based upon 
the wording of the treaty.”). 
119  Chaisse and Li have argued in this respect that “policy considerations 
underlining the non-reflective loss principle that are developed by the domestic 
courts should not be blindly adopted by international arbitration tribunals adjudi-
cating investment treaty disputes.”  Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 84.  Instead, “the 
tribunals should first analyze the policy considerations in the context of interna-
tional investment and economic development.”  Id. 
120  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 29 (quoting Waddington Ltd. v. 
Chan Chun Hoo, [2008] 4 H.K.C. 381, § 49 (C.F.A.)) (noting that “the principle bar-
ring shareholder claims for reflective loss ‘is a matter of legal policy. It is not be-
cause the law does not recognise the loss as a real loss.’”); Johnson v. Gore Wood 
& Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 (“The disallowance of the shareholder’s claim in re-
spect of reflective loss is driven by policy considerations.”); Thomas v. D’Arcy, 
2005 QCA 68 (Queensland Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he no reflective loss principle is 
‘driven by policy considerations’.”). 
121  See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 8 (“The no reflective loss principle is 
based on the view that limiting recovery to the company is both more efficient 
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considerations include consistency, predictability, judicial econo-
my, and avoidance of double recovery.122 
The no reflective loss principle contributes to consistency and 
predictability by prohibiting claims by shareholders, which makes 
it easier for a wrongdoer to predict who will bring a claim for a 
breach.  This reduces the likelihood of multiple claims and, as a re-
sult, inconsistent and conflicting decisions arising out of the same 
events.  In doing so, the no reflective loss principle eliminates the 
likelihood of double recovery by shareholders (both direct recov-
ery and indirect recovery through a company) and reduces the 
costs of litigation, thereby contributing to judicial economy.  Sepa-
rately, the no reflective loss principle is supported by fairness con-
siderations because it is largely considered to be unfair to make a 
party in litigation defend itself again in a separate litigation and 
potentially pay twice for the same breach. 
Regardless of the exact nature of policy considerations, domes-
tic corporate laws across the globe are consistent today in prohibit-
ing shareholder claims for reflective loss.  Corporations bring di-
rect claims for losses they sustain, without having to compete 
against their own shareholders for potential damages.  In this 
world of the no reflective loss principle, a corporation and a 
wrongdoer that litigate their dispute are merely the users of the 
domestic court system.  The rules of civil procedure the corpora-
tion relies on to bring its claim and achieve a dispute resolution, as 
a general rule, do not impact the inner structure of the corporation 
or its corporate governance choices.   
The story is, however, very different in international invest-
ment law.  There, shareholder claims for reflective loss are permit-
ted and they penetrate the corporate shield, contributing to an in-
herent conflict of interests between the shareholders and the 
company.  A rational shareholder with the right to bring its own 
claim for losses suffered by the corporation due to a breach of in-
vestor protection obligations will always bring such a claim in arbi-
tration.123  These shareholder actions will interfere with the control 
                                                                                                                   
and fairer to all interested parties.”) 
122  Id. at 11; see also Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1291 (“One ra-
tionale behind this prohibition [of shareholder claims for reflective loss] rests on 
principles of judicial economy.”). 
123  See DOUGLAS, supra note 115, at 452 (2009) (questioning “why a sharehold-
er would elect to bring a claim for the account of its company if it had the option 
of bypassing the company altogether.  The company might be liable to pay credi-
tors, local taxes and discharge other obligations before distributing the residual 
amount of any damages recovered to the shareholders.”). 
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and management decisions within the corporation, may harm the 
company’s settlement and litigation efforts, and—even more trou-
blesome for the corporate form—may directly benefit treaty-
protected shareholders at the expense of the company, its creditors, 
and all other stakeholders.  For instance, without regard to the 
management decision to settle a dispute with the host state in or-
der to continue operations in the country, a treaty-protected share-
holder can commence an arbitration seeking recovery of reflective 
loss and consequently destroy any attempts by the company to set-
tle.  Moreover, once the treaty-protected shareholders win in arbi-
tration against a host state, they can deplete corporate assets by 
collecting damages otherwise owed to the company. 
In theory, one can anticipate several areas of distortion created 
by reflective loss claims on corporate law and governance, as well 
as the structure of the corporate ownership chain of companies in-
vesting abroad.  In its policy paper, the OECD has examined how 
the rules on reflective loss claims can affect corporate governance 
as well as the corporation and its stakeholders, including share-
holders and creditors.124  The paper suggests that reflective loss 
rules under investment treaties may undermine “entity shield-
ing”125 by allowing a shareholder (a) “partially to liquidate the 
company to the extent of their reflective loss” and (b) to “upset the 
priority rule by giving covered shareholders . . . a priority right to 
corporate assets over creditors.”126  From a firm’s perspective, such 
changes to the corporate law and the incentives they create are par-
ticularly troublesome, in large part, because they deprive present 
and potential creditors of the firm of common expectations as to 
the corporate form and the effect of contracts entered between the 
creditors and the corporation.127  This may impact the ability of and 
the cost for the corporation to obtain future credit.128  On a broader 
                                                   
124  See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 234–46 (2016) (noting that rules 
related to investment treaties may affect companies, shareholders, creditors, capi-
tal markets, and the corporate structuring of investment). 
125  See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the 
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2006) (introducing and defining the 
term “entity shielding” as a form of asset partitioning which “protects firm assets 
from the owners’ personal creditors (and from creditors of other business ven-
tures), thus reserving those assets for the firm’s creditors.”). 
126  OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 236. 
127  See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (“Entity shielding doctrine . . . is 
needed to create common expectations, among a firm and its various present and 
potential creditors, concerning the effect that a contract between a firm and one of 
its creditors will have one the security available to the firm’s other creditors.”). 
128  See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 45 n.104 (noting that “[a] policy 
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scale, as the OECD has suggested, this may affect the “corporate 
personality” of the company, including its ability to “serve as a 
single contracting party and make credible commitments, and its 
ability to use its assets to obtain credit.”129  Undermining entity 
shielding in the corporation has a significant impact on its creditors 
and may injure creditors when shareholders recover damages, 
thereby effectively stripping away corporate assets.130 
While domestic courts have addressed the same questions of 
partial liquidation of corporate assets and changes to the priority 
rules, they have consistently protected the corporate form by ap-
plying the no reflective loss principle.  For instance, in Holmes v. Se-
curities Investor Protection Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
“a suit by an indirectly injured victim could be an attempt to cir-
cumvent the relative priority its claim would have in the directly 
injured victim’s liquidation proceedings.”131  Similarly, the court in 
Gaubert v. United States has explained that, “[w]ere common share-
holders allowed to sue directly and individually for damages to the 
value of their shares, we would be allowing them to bypass the 
corporate structure and effectively preference themselves at the 
expense of the other persons with a superior financial interest in 
the corporation.”132  International arbitral tribunals have been blind 
to the corporate law concerns, allowing shareholder claims for re-
flective loss that may lead to the distortions to the corporate law 
and governance and, in effect, redistribute wealth from the corpo-
ration and its creditors to the treaty-protected shareholders. 
The OECD has further observed that the rules on reflective loss 
will affect shareholders differentially since only a subset of share-
holders will be covered by a treaty and, within this subset, only 
some shareholders will be likely to bring a claim (due to the high 
                                                                                                                   
that puts creditors of companies engaged in foreign investment at risk may affect 
the availability and price of debt finance for foreign investment.”). 
129  OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 237. 
130  See id. at 239–40 (explaining that shareholder claims for reflective loss can 
hurt creditors); Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 44 (“[A]llowing that shareholders 
claims for reflective loss can injure creditors of the company (unless the defendant 
is forced to pay the same damages twice).”); see also KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 
2, at 2 (explaining that conflicts between shareholders and the corporation’s other 
constituencies, including creditors, are one of the three principal agency conflicts 
that are addressed by corporate law). 
131  Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992). 
132  Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1291 (5th Cir. 1989), rev’d, 499 
U.S. 315 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
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cost of investment arbitration).133  This differential treatment may 
provide incentives to some shareholders to restructure to benefit 
from a stronger investor protection regime.134  In addition, the right 
to submit a claim for reflective loss in investment arbitration pro-
vides leverage to treaty-protected shareholders in their negotia-
tions with the management on various important corporate issues, 
including arbitration and settlement strategy.135  Furthermore, 
shareholder claims for reflective loss may impact the centralized 
management of the corporation by the board of directors, who are 
generally vested with making business decisions.  Instead, the 
rules on reflective loss allow shareholders to individually make 
important decisions on “key issues of corporate interest,” such as 
whether to commence an investment arbitration.136  In addition, the 
OECD has suggested that the rules on reflective loss claims may 
interfere and have adverse effect on the transferability and liquidi-
ty of shares, although the impact of these rules on such issues is 
currently unclear.137 
One can add to the OECD’s impact list a further impact area, 
which Lord Millett identified in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. with re-
spect to domestic claims for reflective loss.138  Lord Millett argued 
that allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss would create a 
conflict of interest for directors who are also shareholders of the 
company and, in this latter capacity, likely interested in bringing a 
personal suit, thereby undermining the company’s efforts to set-
tle.139  The same concern is valid in the context of international in-
vestment law, where there are high damages at stake resulting 
from failed investment projects abroad.  Allowing reflective loss 
claims creates a conflict of interest for shareholders who are also 
directors.  As in domestic corporate law, these shareholders would 
                                                   
133  See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 237–38 (noting that in view of 
the high costs of ISDS provisions of investment treaties are likely to divide share-
holders into separate groups, or subsets, including shareholders that are not cov-
ered by a treaty and shareholders that are unlikely to bring claims). 
134  See id. 
135  See id. 
136  See id. at 244. 
137  See id. at 238–39 (explaining how share transferability and liquidity can be 
adversely affected). 
138  See generally Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) at 66 (dis-
cussing reflective loss). 
139  See id. (“[I]f the company’s action were brought by its directors [who are 
also shareholders], they would be placed in a position where their interest con-
flicted with their duty . . . .”). 
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likely be interested in bringing personal claims instead of making 
decisions in their director’s capacity for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. 
In addition to creating a conflict of interest for some sharehold-
ers, reflective loss claims create a problem of shareholder inequali-
ty.  They provide additional rights to treaty-protected shareholders 
that other shareholders of the same corporation do not have, even 
though they might have paid the same price for the shares.  These 
rights—including the rights to bring a claim in arbitration, to de-
cide on a strategy in arbitration and/or whether to settle, and to 
collect damages awarded in arbitration—give treaty-protected 
shareholders the upper hand in their negotiations with corporate 
management once an investment dispute arises. 
Apart from the impact on corporate governance, shareholder 
claims for reflective loss may contribute to forum- and treaty-
shopping.  International investment law provides incentives to the 
corporation to restructure to benefit from a more beneficial inves-
tor protection regime.  The reflective loss claims increase the likeli-
hood and complexity of restructuring within the corporate owner-
ship chain because, in addition to incentives to the company, it 
provides incentives to the shareholders to acquire more beneficial 
protection for present or potential reflective loss claims. 
With these predictions in mind, let us examine the practice of 
arbitral tribunals with a view of studying the impact of sharehold-
er claims on corporate law and governance, as well as on structur-
ing of the multinational corporations that have chosen to invest 
abroad.  I will discuss two categories of cases:  disputes that illus-
trate the impact of reflective loss claims on (1) corporate govern-
ance, and (2) the structure of the corporations. 
3.2.  Empirical evidence and case studies 
3.2.1.  Reflective loss and corporate governance 
 
One of the most recent cases that reflects the essence of the 
problem of reflective loss claims is the Eskosol arbitration.140  The 
facts of this case deserve closer attention.  The dispute in Eskosol 
emerged from a regulatory change in the Italian renewable energy 
sector that led to the abandonment of photovoltaic (PV) project by 
                                                   
140  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 122 (adjudicating on and discussing the core 
problem of reflective loss claims).  
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a foreign investor and a bankruptcy of a locally-incorporated Ital-
ian company, Eskosol.  The case demonstrates how claims by trea-
ty-protected shareholders can conflict with the interests of the 
company and its creditors, especially if the company is in financial 
distress and would benefit from submitting its own claim and col-
lecting damages awarded to the shareholder.  The Eskosol arbitra-
tion is the second arbitration resulting from the same facts in a dis-
pute with Italy.141  It follows an ICSID arbitration under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) brought by Eskosol’s majority shareholder—
Blusun S.A.—and two individuals who owned Blusun.142  Italy 
prevailed in the Blusun arbitration but is currently facing an ICSID 
annulment proceeding.143 
Eskosol was constituted in Italy in 2009 as a limited liability 
company (S.r.l.), but was later transformed into an Italian joint 
stock company (S.p.A.).144  Eskosol was established by its share-
holders—a Belgian company Blusun (which originally held a 50% 
equity stake in Eskosol, but over time increased its equity to 80%) 
and four Italian nationals (by the time of the dispute only two of 
them remained shareholders, each holding a 10% equity).145  In its 
turn, Blusun was owned by two individuals—a French citizen and 
a German citizen.146 
As a project company, Eskosol was to develop, build, and con-
nect to the national power grid a number of solar PV power plants 
in Italy.  Eskosol allegedly invested €38.5 million to the planning, 
construction, and operation of its solar energy generation project 
comprising of 120 solar PV power plants.147  Between May and July 
2010, Eskosol acquired 100% shareholding in 12 special purpose 
vehicle companies (SPVs), thus receiving access to all permits, 
                                                   
141  Id. (noting that “Italy argue[d] that ‘the dispute’ . . . already has been 
submitted to arbitration in the Blusun case.”). 
142  See generally Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Final Award (Dec. 27, 2016) [hereinafter 
Blusun]. 
143  See generally Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Application for Annulment (May 2, 2017). 
144  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶20 (indicating that Eskosol was established on 
December 21, 2009, as a limited liability partnership). 
145  Id. ¶¶ 20–21 (describing how Eskosol was established). 
146  Id. ¶ 20 (“Blusun in turn was owned by two individuals, Messrs. Jean-
Pierre Lecorcier, a French citizen, and Michael Stein, a German citizen.”). 
147  Id. ¶ 23 (“The Claimant alleges that it made a number of investments in 
relation to the development of a solar energy generation project in Italy compris-
ing 120 solar PV power plants.  Eskosol allegedly devoted approximately €38.5 
million to the planning, construction and operation of the plants.”). 
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rights, entitlements, and infrastructure necessary to bring its plants 
into operation within eighteen months.  Eskosol also began work 
on the installation of a 150- to 180-kilometer private network of ca-
bles to connect each plant to dedicated substations.  In December 
2010, it entered into an agreement with Siemens S.p.A. for the con-
struction and commissioning of the plants.148 
At the time when Eskosol was created, Italy had in place a 
feed-in tariffs (FITs) program that guaranteed fixed payments to 
qualifying photovoltaic (PV) power plants that generated energy 
from renewable sources.  The Italian government subsequently 
adopted two regulatory measures—the “Romani decree” and the 
“Conto Energia IV”—which reduced the FITs, making Eskosol’s 
projects economically unviable.149  Eskosol alleges in the ICSID ar-
bitration that these changes in the FIT program have forced it to 
abandon its PV projects and led to Eskosol’s inability to pay its 
debts.  As a result, it argues, Eskosol was declared insolvent and 
placed under receivership in November 2013.150 
Soon thereafter, on February 21, 2014, the majority shareholder 
of Eskosol—Belgian company Blusun and its owners—began an 
ICSID arbitration challenging regulatory measures by the Italian 
government.  The Blusun claimants sought recovery of the “loss of 
investment made and to the capital gains that the Claimants were 
unable to realize on their investments,” in an amount estimated to 
be €187.8 million.151  Eskosol’s claims arise directly out of the losses 
that it suffered as the operating company.152  According to Eskosol, 
Blusun initiated and litigated the ICSID arbitration without con-
sulting Eskosol, attempting to “usurp Eskosol’s claims and seek 
compensation for its direct losses.”153  Furthermore, Eskosol alleges 
that claimants in the Blusun arbitration have not cooperated with 
                                                   
148  Id. ¶ 24 (“On December 29, 2010, Eskosol entered into an engineering, 
construction and procurement agreement . . . with Siemens S.p.A . . . for the con-
struction and commissioning of the plants.”). 
149  Id. ¶¶ 25–26. 
150  See id. ¶ 27 (“The Claimant asserts that the Eskosol Project became eco-
nomically unviable as a result of these measures, and Eskosol had no alternative 
but to abandon its project.”). 
151  Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 48. 
152  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 161 (“In its view, the excerpts suggests [sic] 
that Blusun sought recovery for lost ‘capital gains’ benefits it could have secured 
by selling its shareholding in Eskosol, while Eskosol’s claims arise directly out of 
the losses that it suffered as the operating company.”). 
153  Id. ¶ 151. 
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Eskosol’s insolvency proceedings.154  With the Blusun arbitration 
then pending, on December 9, 2015, Eskosol filed its own request 
for ICSID arbitration under the ECT against Italy.155 
Aware of the Blusun arbitration that derived largely from the 
same facts as its own arbitration, Eskosol states that it attempted to 
consolidate the two arbitrations, but its request to consolidate was 
denied by the Blusun tribunal.156  Eskosol further sought permis-
sion to intervene in the Blusun arbitration proceedings by submit-
ting its observations as a non-disputing party under ICSID Arbitra-
tion Rule 37(2).157  In its application, Eskosol argued that claims by 
Blusun and its owners were of an “abusive nature” and, in particu-
lar, that the Blusun claimants were “attempting to abuse these [ar-
bitral] proceedings by seeking damages to which only Eskosol is 
entitled.”158  It also disputed that awarding damages to Blusun and 
its owners would prejudice Eskosol, its creditors, and its minority 
shareholders.159  In addition, Eskosol raised concerns that “the 
Blusun claimants ‘have no authority to represent Eskosol’s inter-
ests’ in the Blusun case, but nonetheless were attempting to obtain 
compensation ‘for all of Eskosol’s losses . . . without the intent to 
channel these moneys into Eskosol so Eskosol can reimburse any 
such payments to the Eskosol Creditors.”160  The arbitral tribunal 
denied Eskosol’s application to submit observations as a non-
party.161  The tribunal indicated that the non-party submission 
could disrupt the arbitral proceeding as it was submitted “extraor-
                                                   
154  See id. ¶ 29 (“Eskosol further asserts that the Blusun claimants have not 
cooperated with Eskosol’s insolvency proceedings.”). 
155  Id. ¶ 30 (“When Eskosol filed its Request in this case on December 9, 2015, 
it acknowledged the pendency of the Blusun case, but stated that ‘[t]he present 
claim is distinct and separate from that being pursued’ by the Blusun claimants.” 
(citation omitted)). 
156  See id. (noting that the Blusun tribunal denied Eskosol’s request to consol-
idate).  It is unclear who proposed to consolidate the two arbitrations.  In the 
Blusun case, Italy claimed that it proposed to Blusun and Eskosol to consolidate 
their two cases, but they refused.  See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (recalling Italy’s 
consolidation proposal to Blusun and Eskosol as a ground to deny Eskosol’s re-
quest to intervene as a non-disputing party in the Blusun case). 
157  See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶¶ 42–43 (rejecting Eskosol’s application to 
intervene). 
158  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 31 (quoting Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 5). 
159  See id. (reciting Eskosol’s application to intervene in the Blusun case). 
160  Id. 
161  See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (explaining how the tribunal rejected the 
party’s application). 
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dinarily late” and there was no excuse for such lateness.162 
In the Eskosol arbitration, on November 18, 2016, Italy attempt-
ed to secure a summary dismissal of Eskosol‘s case by filing an Ob-
jection under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules arguing 
that the claims were manifestly without legal merit.163  Soon there-
after, on December 27, 2016, Blusun lost its arbitration on the mer-
its.164  This allowed Italy to add res judicata (and collateral estop-
pel) arguments to its Objection, arguing that the Blusun award has 
preclusive effect on the dispute between Eskosol and Italy.165  As a 
result, Italy presented four separate grounds for its application un-
der Rule 41(5).166  In particular, Italy argued that Eskosol was no 
longer a foreign investor because it was not under “foreign con-
trol” by Blusun, as required by the ECT to establish jurisdiction.  
Italy further argued that Eskosol was under the control of a bank-
ruptcy receiver and an Italian bankruptcy court.167  In light of the 
Blusun arbitration, Italy also argued that under Article 26(3)(b)(i) 
and Annex ID of the ECT Treaty, Italy did not give its uncondi-
tional consent to arbitration because an investor has previously 
submitted the dispute to resolution in the Blusun arbitration.168  
Separately, Italy argued that public international law principles 
“preclude the opening of a new proceeding on a dispute that pre-
viously was submitted to another international arbitration tribunal 
(lis pendens), or actually was decided by such a tribunal (res judicata 
or collateral estoppel).”169  According to Italy, the Blusun arbitra-
                                                   
162  Id.  By the time Eskosol submitted its request to intervene as a non-
disputing party, the hearings on jurisdiction and the merits in the arbitral pro-
ceedings in the Blusun case were held.  See id. ¶¶ 33, 42 (noting that the hearings 
were held in April 2016, while ICSID received Eskosol’s application to intervene 
in June 2016).  Hence, the tribunal noted that Eskosol’s submission was made very 
late, even though Eskosol knew about the Blusun arbitration and could have made 
its submission earlier in the arbitral proceedings.  See id. ¶ 43 (“The Tribunal also 
notes that Eskosol’s Application was submitted extraordinarily late and that there 
is no excuse for the lateness.”). 
163  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 13 (stating that Italy filed an objection). 
164  See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 423 (dismissing the entirety of Blusun’s 
claims on the merits). 
165  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶¶ 136–37, 148 (reciting Italy’s res judicata de-
fense). 
166  See id. ¶ 43 (“Italy presents four separate grounds for its application that 
the Tribunal dismiss Eskosol’s claims for manifest lack of legal merit . . . .”). 
167  See id. ¶ 59 (explaining Eskosol’s bankruptcy proceedings). 
168  See id. ¶ 121–24 (reciting Italy’s argument that its “consent [to ISDS] pro-
vided in the ECT did not extend to the initiation of a new arbitration proceeding 
involving . . . ‘perfect identity of object and cause’ with the prior Blusun case.”). 
169  Id. ¶ 136. (footnotes omitted). 
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tion was a “parallel proceeding[] with perfect identity of object and 
cause.”170 
On its side, Eskosol argued that there was no legal basis to de-
prive Eskosol of its legal right, since Eskosol and Blusun were not 
substantially the same claimants.  It further argued that Blusun 
was not authorized to present Eskosol in the first arbitration; to the 
contrary, Blusun and its owners (1) failed to consult with Eskosol 
in making a decision to bring an ICSID arbitration and (2) failed to 
communicate with Eskosol during the course of their arbitration, 
(3) refused to consider a consolidation of two arbitrations, (4) did 
not represent the interests of Eskosol, including its minority share-
holders and creditors, and (5) had “no intention of sharing any 
proceeds with Eskosol to make it whole.”171 
The tribunal was unconvinced with Italy’s arguments raised in 
the Rule 41(5) objection.  It denied Italy’s application for dismissal 
of Eskosol’s claims on the grounds that they are “manifestly with-
out legal merit,” pursuant to Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules.172  The Eskosol case is currently pending, and it remains to 
be seen what consequences the Blusun award will have on the tri-
bunal’s decision in the Eskosol arbitration. 
The Italian objection under Rule 41(5) and its outcome under-
line the problem of reflective loss claims.  Having failed to secure a 
summary dismissal, Italy is forced to defend itself in the second 
proceeding against claims derived from the same facts and, in do-
ing so, to spend substantial financial resources on its defense.173  
Moreover, having won against Eskosol’s majority shareholder 
Blusun and Blusun’s owners, it is now forced to defend against 
Eskosol.  Ironically, the ability of Eskosol as an Italian company to 
bring a claim in arbitration is based on the fact that the company is 
                                                   
170  Id. ¶ 43. 
171  Id. ¶ 156 (footnote omitted). 
172  Id. ¶ 173.  
173  A host state’s average legal defenses costs are $4.5 million in legal fees in 
addition to about $373,200 in tribunal costs (if tribunal costs are split equally be-
tween parties).  See Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Cost of Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 24, 2014) (describing an Allen & Overy study of 
176 investment treaty arbitration cases).  Another study of 138 ICSID arbitrations 
concluded in the period of July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2015, revealed higher costs of, 
on average, $5,619,261.74 for claimants and $4,954,461.27 for respondents, in addi-
tion to $882,668.19 in tribunal costs.  See generally Jeffery P. Commission, How 
Much Does an ICSID Arbitration Cost? A Snapshot of the Last Five Years, KLUWER ARB. 
BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/29/how-much-
does-an-icsid-arbitration-cost-a-snapshot-of-the-last-five-years/ 
[https://perma.cc/D3NB-6P4Q]. 
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majority owned and controlled by Blusun, whose claims were de-
nied in the Blusun arbitration.174  The Eskosol arbitration thus gives 
Blusun a second chance to argue its case, although indirectly 
through Eskosol.175  Given the circumstances of the Eskosol case, 
Blusun is unlikely to benefit from any damages awarded to Esko-
sol, as Eskosol is currently in a bankruptcy proceeding.  But con-
sidering that the damages might help Eskosol to pay its creditors 
and emerge from bankruptcy as a viable company, Blusun might 
benefit without collecting monetary damages directly.  Generally 
speaking, one can anticipate that where a company is financially 
stable and brings its claims in arbitration following an arbitration 
lost by its shareholder, a second arbitration would effectively pro-
vide the shareholder with the so-called second bite at the apple 
and may benefit such shareholders indirectly. 
From Eskosol’s perspective, the Blusun arbitration—although it 
was lost by Blusun—creates concerns of the res judicata effect of 
the Blusun award.  Under the circumstances of the case, Blusun 
commenced its arbitration without coordinating with Eskosol or 
taking into account the company’s interest.  Furthermore, the 
Blusun tribunal did not take into account Eskosol’s interests 
through either consolidation, or submissions by a non-party.  As a 
result, Eskosol’s interests were not presented in the Blusun arbitra-
tion, yet the outcome of the Blusun arbitration might have a preclu-
sive effect on the Eskosol decision due to res judicata. 
Deciding on Italy’s Objection under Rule 41(5), the tribunal did 
not grant the Blusun award res judicata effect, mainly because Italy 
was bound by a confidentiality agreement with Blusun and could 
not provide the tribunal with a copy of the Blusun award to make 
                                                   
174  In the Eskosol arbitration, Eskosol brought claims against Italy under the 
ECT.  Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 1 (“This case concerns a dispute submitted to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes . . . on the basis of the 
Energy Charter Treaty.”).  Under Article 26(7) of the ECT, a company that has a 
nationality of the host state, but is controlled by investors of another state, is treat-
ed as a national of the other state.  See ECT, supra note 104, art. 26(7) (“An Investor 
which . . . is controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party, shall for the 
purpose of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention be treated as a ‘national of an-
other Contracting State’.”).  Consequently, although an Italian company, Eskosol 
is treated as a Belgian company for purposes of the ICSID Convention. 
175  The circumstances of this case show that Eskosol is in bankruptcy and 
that its ICSID arbitration was commenced on Eskosol’s behalf by the bankruptcy 
receiver.  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 27 (“Eskosol’s bankruptcy receiver is Mr. Te-
odoro Contardi, who has the power to institute proceedings on behalf of Eskosol, 
as a matter of Italian law.”).  But circumstances may vary and in other instances 
shareholders can benefit from the follow-up arbitrations by the company, effec-
tively rearguing the case after shareholders’ loss in a prior arbitration. 
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an assessment of whether the two cases were largely identical.176  
However, in the future proceeding the tribunal can still grant the 
Blusun award res judicata effect.177  An indicator of this is the fact 
that the tribunal ordered Italy to submit a copy of the Blusun 
award in the Eskosol arbitration.178  ICSID has since published the 
Blusun award and it remains to be seen if and how the Eskosol arbi-
tration will be affected by the Blusun award. 
From the corporate governance perspective, the Blusun case 
demonstrates how shareholder claims for reflective loss can actual-
ize conflicts of interests between shareholders and “their” compa-
nies.  Instead of just being a theoretical concern and a possible 
cause of tension at the shareholder meetings, reflective loss claims 
allow shareholders to directly oppose the company and its man-
agement.  They give shareholders a right to bypass corporate gov-
ernance choices and benefit directly by collecting damages for loss-
es suffered by the corporation due to a breach of investor 
protection obligations.  Moreover, even if a treaty-protected share-
holder loses in its arbitration, it can destroy the company’s ability 
to seek damages for breaches of investor protection obligations 
through res judicata. 
Two additional observations can be made with regards to the 
Eskosol case.  First, there is an inherent conflict of interest between 
the shareholders and the management of the corporation.  Grant-
ing the right to bring a claim in arbitration to shareholders pro-
vides shareholders with a means to bypass the corporate manage-
ment and control structure of the company and submit a claim to 
arbitration disregarding the company’s interests.  In the Eskosol 
case, the company actively sought but failed to reach an agreement 
with Blusun, which chose to submit its own claims to arbitration in 
the hope it could benefit directly.  Second, various procedural 
mechanisms—such as claim consolidation and submission of non-
party observations—that would theoretically allow coordination 
between the company’s and the shareholders’ interests may not 
                                                   
176  See id. ¶ 32 n.35 (“Italy contends that it is restricted by confidentiality ob-
ligations agreed in the Blusun case from submitting the full Award to this Tribu-
nal.”). 
177  See id. ¶ 172 (inviting Italy to invoke the Blusun award later in the case, by 
stating that “Italy is free later in this case to argue, if it so wishes, that the conclu-
sions of the Blusun tribunal were persuasive and should be followed by this Tri-
bunal, exercising its independent judgment.”). 
178  See id. ¶ 173 “[T]he Tribunal . . . . [o]rders Italy, to the extent and at such 
time as it wishes to rely on the Blusun award for any purpose in this case, to pro-
duce such award in full.”). 
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always work for various reasons.  For instance, the applicable arbi-
tration rules might not provide for consolidation,179 or either the 
parties or the arbitral tribunal might not agree on consolidation.  
Similarly, non-party submissions could not be allowed by the tri-
bunal or the parties, for instance, where such submissions interfere 
with the arbitral proceedings.180 
 
3.2.2.  Reflective loss and corporate structure 
 
Critics of the ISDS system often suspect corporate claimants of 
treaty- and forum-shopping, alleging that multinational corpora-
tions restructure solely to benefit from a stronger investor protec-
tion regime.181  There are no definite studies uncovering why com-
panies investing abroad restructure and, for shareholders in 
particular, what role reflective loss claims play in corporate re-
structuring.182  However, there are cases that suggest that reflective 
loss claims contribute to treaty- and forum-shopping through cor-
porate restructuring. 
In Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela, in the midst of changes to the 
regulatory regime of the Venezuelan petroleum industry, the 
claimants created a new private company under the laws of the 
Netherlands that was wholly owned by Mobil, a Delaware corpo-
ration.183  Within a year, the Dutch company acquired all shares in 
                                                   
179  For instance, the ICSID Convention and Arbitration rules do not provide 
for consolidation specifically.  See generally, ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 
(2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH6K-45QY]. 
180  For instance, the Blusun tribunal has refused the non-party submission by 
Eskosol because the tribunal thought the submission was too late and could inter-
fere with the arbitral proceedings.  See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (explaining 
how the tribunal rejected the party’s application). 
181  Similarly, host states have argued that institution by the “same substan-
tial investor” of two parallel proceedings before two different tribunals amounts 
to forum-shopping and should be prohibited as such.  See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 
9, ¶ 127 (reciting Italy’s argument equating multiple related proceedings to pro-
hibitive forum shopping). 
182  See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 244 (noting the lack of any stud-
ies showing companies disbursing shareholders across jurisdictions to obtain the 
benefits of a larger number of investment treaties). 
183  See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶ 20 (“[T]he claimants in October 
2005 created a new entity under the laws of the Netherlands, Venezuela Holdings, 
and inserted it into the corporate chains for the Cerro Negro and La Ceiba Projects 
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two Delaware companies indirectly involved in the Venezuelan oil 
projects through two Bahamian companies.184  Having thus insert-
ed a Dutch holding company into the corporate chain of owner-
ship, the claimants filed for arbitration on September 6, 2007—less 
than a year after the second acquisition—under the Dutch-
Venezuelan BIT.185  It should be noted that as of today—nearly a 
decade later—neither the United States nor the Bahamas has a BIT 
with Venezuela.  Without its newly created Dutch company, Mobil 
would not have been able to claim protection under an investment 
treaty.  The tribunal in this case focused on the timing of the re-
structuring.  It distinguished between pre-existing and future dis-
putes and established jurisdiction only with respect to disputes 
that arose after the respective dates of acquisition of two Delaware 
companies by the Dutch entity.186  In doing so, the tribunal con-
cluded that both Delaware subsidiaries of the Dutch company 
were to be considered as nationals of the Netherlands because of 
their control by the Dutch entity.  No actual control had to be es-
tablished as it was presumed that the Dutch company could exer-
cise control because it owned 100% shares of both Delaware sub-
sidiaries, which in turn wholly owned the Bahamian companies 
and the investment.187  Perhaps not surprisingly, while the arbitra-
tion was ongoing, Venezuela submitted a notice of unilateral ter-
mination of its BIT with the Netherlands in April 2008.188 
                                                                                                                   
in February 2006 and November 2006 respectively.”). 
184  See id. ¶¶ 21–22 (“Mobil (Delaware) owns 100% of Venezuela Holdings 
(Netherlands), which owns 100% of Mobil CN Holding (Delaware)” and “100 % 
of Mobil Venezolana (Bahamas), which finally owns a 50 % interest in the La Cei-
ba Association.”). 
185  See id. ¶ 1 (describing request for arbitration). 
186  See id. ¶ 206 (limiting the tribunal’s jurisdiction to only those disputes that 
arose after the Dutch company acquired the Delaware and Bahamian companies). 
187  See id. ¶ 160 (ruling that holding 100% of the subsidiary share capital was 
enough to establish control under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT). 
188  See Luke Eric Peterson, Venezuela Surprises the Netherlands with Termination 
Notice for BIT; Treaty Has Been Used by Many Investors to “Route” Investments into 
Venezuela, INV. ARB. REP. (May 16, 2008), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/venezuela-surprises-the-netherlands-with-
termination-notice-for-bit-treaty-has-been-used-by-many-investors-to-route-
investments-into-venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/MZX5-LRMZ] (discussing Vene-
zuela’s termination notice to the Netherlands in April 2008); see also The Importance 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) When Investing in Emerging Markets, A.B.A. 
(June 29, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/03
/01_sprenger/[https://perma.cc/6KLV-QZUP] (stating that the official termina-
tion occurred on November 1, 2008). 
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Some cases of corporate restructuring are blatantly fraudulent, 
and tribunals have no difficulty recognizing this.  In Phoenix v. 
Czech Republic, a former Czech national incorporated an Israeli 
company, forced it to acquire an interest in the Czech companies 
owned by members of his family and already involved in the liti-
gation with the Czech authorities, and then filed for an arbitration 
under the Czech-Israeli BIT.189  Having examined the timing of the 
investment and the nature and substance of the transaction, the ar-
bitral tribunal established that the “Claimant’s initiation and pur-
suit of [the] arbitration [was] an abuse of the system of internation-
al ICSID investment arbitration” and accordingly found that it 
lacked jurisdiction.190 
In Tidewater v. Venezuela, the claimants conducted their opera-
tions in Venezuela through Tidewater Marine Service, C.A. 
(“SEMARCA”), a company incorporated in Venezuela and owned 
by another Venezuelan company—Tidewater Caribe.191  Tidewater 
Caribe was owned by a company in the Cayman Islands, which 
was in turn owned by Tidewater, Inc. (a U.S. corporation).192  
Through SEMARCA, the claimants provided marine support ser-
vices to the oil industry in Venezuela under commercial contracts 
with certain Venezuelan national and semi-national oil compa-
nies.193  In 2008–2009, once oil prices fell, the Venezuelan national 
oil companies struggled to pay for services under the contracts 
with SEMARCA.194  As the arrears grew, SEMARCA continued 
providing services but ultimately halted its performance and re-
fused to extend its contracts until the arrears were reduced.195  
While the contractual dispute was developing, Tidewater, Inc. cre-
ated a new corporation in Barbados—Tidewater Barbados—and 
                                                   
189  See generally Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5, Award (Apr. 15, 2009). 
190  Id. ¶ 144.  
191  See Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Caribe, C.A. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 
2–3 (Feb. 8, 2013) (describing the dispute). 
192  See id. ¶ 3 (describing the corporate ownership structure of the local Ven-
ezuelan investment). 
193  See id. ¶¶ 2, 5 (noting that Venezuelan national oil company PDVSA en-
gaged SEMARCA for oil industry support services).  
194  See ¶¶ 154–64 (describing contractual dispute between SEMARCA and 
PDVSA). 
195  See id. ¶ 169 (“On 6 April 2009, Mr Jacob wrote to PDVSA to say that 
SEMARCA would not continue to provide services to PDVSA after the expiration 
of the two contracts due to expire on 31 May 2009 unless the arrears were re-
duced.”). 
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transferred to it all the shares of Tidewater Caribe.196  Tidewater 
Barbados was thus inserted into the claimants’ chain of corporate 
ownership, becoming the sole owner of Tidewater Caribe. 
About two months after the creation of the Barbados company, 
Venezuela seized the claimants’ operations and assets in Venezue-
la, including fifteen vessels, driven in particular by concerns that 
“the service companies might remove their vessels from Venezue-
la” and as a “response to contractors refusing to lower their rates 
by at least 40%.”197  On 16 February 2010, the claimants filed a re-
quest for arbitration under the ICSID Convention invoking the 
Barbados-Venezuela BIT.  The request for arbitration was amended 
on March 1, 2013 following the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction 
of February 8, 2013. 
In the arbitration, Venezuela objected to the tribunal’s jurisdic-
tion, arguing that the claimant’s restructuring constituted an abuse 
of right under international law.198  The claimants through its ex-
pert witness effectively acknowledged that the “restructuring was 
motivated by both tax considerations and also by ‘risk mitigation 
perspectives.’”199  The tribunal found that there was no abuse of 
the treaty by the claimants.  It accepted the claimant’s argument 
that it thought to protect itself from a risk of expropriation, but on-
ly with respect to the general risk of future disputes.200  Having 
then distinguished between the pre-existing contractual dispute 
and the expropriation dispute, and found that the acts of expropri-
ation were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the restructur-
ing, the tribunal established jurisdiction only with respect to the 
expropriation claims.201 
Finally, in the infamous Philip Morris v. Australia case, the tri-
                                                   
196  See id. ¶ 166 (“The formal steps for the incorporation of Tidewater Barba-
dos and its acquisition of the shares of Tidewater Caribe were taken in Barbados 
and Venezuela from 25 February to 9 March 2009 . . . .”). 
197  Id. ¶¶ 174, 177. 
198  See id. ¶ 48 (describing Venezuela’s claim of lack of jurisdiction). 
199  Id. ¶ 183 (footnote omitted). 
200  See id. ¶ 184 (“[I]t is a perfectly legitimate goal, and no abuse an invest-
ment protection treaty regime, for an investor to seek to protect itself from the 
general risk of future disputes with a host state in this way.  But the same is not 
the case in relation to pre-existing disputes between the specific investor and the 
state.”). 
201  See id. ¶ 194 (holding Venezuela’s threat to withhold service agreement 
payments were contractual and not an act of expropriation); id. ¶¶ 197–99 (hold-
ing Venezuelan acts of expropriation were not foreseeable during the corporate 
restructuring). 
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bunal notably declined jurisdiction because Philip Morris was not 
“able to prove that tax or other business reasons were determina-
tive for the restructuring [which lead the tribunal to] conclude that 
the main and determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring 
was the intention to bring a claim under the [Hong Kong-Australia 
BIT].”202 
The above cases illustrate that the companies and their share-
holders sometimes restructure solely to acquire the benefits of a 
stronger investor protection regime with respect to imminent or 
potential investment disputes.  The reflective loss claims available 
to shareholders have arguably contributed to the dynamics of these 
restructuring efforts by providing incentives to restructure not on-
ly to the local company and its direct shareholders, but also to indi-
rect shareholders at the higher levels of the corporate ownership 
chain.  The challenge for the tribunals in these cases is to distin-
guish instances of restructuring that are motivated by genuine 
business or tax considerations from opportunistic actions by the 
management that seek to exploit the ISDS system and may hurt the 
company.  In a separate and forthcoming article, I will examine the 
role of investment treaties and disputes, including the rules on re-
flective loss claims, in the restructuring of the multinational corpo-
rations and their corporate ownership chains. 
 
3.3.  Lessons for the law and public policy 
 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, investment arbitra-
tion cases provide evidence that shareholder claims for reflective 
loss impact corporate law, its governance, and the corporate own-
ership structure of companies investing abroad.  The case studies 
offer several lessons for the law and public policy.  First, the impact 
of investment treaties on attracting foreign investments might be 
less significant than expected,203 because companies may establish 
                                                   
202  Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 584 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
203  Prior studies on the impact of investor protection treaties on attracting 
foreign investment are inconclusive.  One of the recent studies has demonstrated 
that there might be benefits of BITs for lower- and middle-income countries, but 
not to high-income countries, although there are observable differences among 
world regions.  See, e.g., Arjan Lejour & Maria Salfi, The Regional Impact of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis, CPB Discussion Paper 298, Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/cpb-discussion-
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a presence in a foreign jurisdiction only to benefit from a stronger 
investment protection regime.  Although they may be considered 
foreign investors under local law, some of these companies may 
not actually provide investments and contribute to the economy of 
the host state. 
Second, with regard to companies’ decision-making process, 
prior studies have suggested that companies make decisions to in-
vest abroad largely based on business and tax considerations.  
They rarely, if at all, consider the advantages of a particular inves-
tor protection regime.204  Yet, as cases discussed in this Article sug-
gest, if and when a dispute is looming, a foreign investor becomes 
more aware and responsive to an investor protection regime and 
may seek to opportunistically benefit through restructuring or as-
set transfers.  International investment law can respond to these 
concerns by reducing the pool of potential claimants under inves-
tor protection treaties.  For instance, this can be achieved by limit-
ing protection to the local companies under foreign control and 
their direct shareholders.  Countries could also consider a greater 
reliance on the denial of benefits provisions, which would allow 
them to revoke a consent to arbitrate where the claimant did not 
make any real investments in the host state. 
Third, by allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss, inter-
national investment law may trump domestic corporate law rules 
and impact the corporate structure and governance choices of the 
companies investing abroad.  One can identify three broad catego-
ries of such impact—legal, corporate governance, and structural effects.  
Legal effects include changes of the legal framework within which 
the corporation operates.  This framework changes for the corpora-
tion once the company invests abroad and acquires the benefits of 
investor protection.  Most importantly, for corporate investors, in-
vestment treaties not only provide investor protection guarantees, 
                                                                                                                   
paper-298-regional-impact-bilateral-investment-treaties-foreign-direct-
investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/C42C-P4F3] (concluding that “[u]pper middle 
income countries seem to benefit the most from BITs. . . .  [but] BITs do not sup-
port significantly foreign investment in high income countries.”). 
204  See, e.g., COLUM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INV., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES (March 2018), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/04/07-Columbia-IIA-investor-policy-
briefing-ENG-mr.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FDF-XV42] (“Studies on determinants 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) confirm that other factors—such  as market size 
and growth, the availability of natural resources, and the quality of hard and soft 
infrastructure—tend to be far more important to investors than investment trea-
ties when making the decision to invest.”). 
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but in effect alter the dynamics of intra-corporate relationships—
the matters which are generally governed by domestic law of the 
company’s state of incorporation.  The right of shareholders to 
bring individual claims in investment arbitration for reflective loss 
allows shareholders to independently make decisions that affect, 
and may harm, the corporation.  First and foremost, treaty-
protected shareholders can decide on their own whether to begin 
an arbitration against a host state to recover reflective losses suf-
fered by the corporation.  None of the advanced systems of corpo-
rate law allow shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss and 
benefit from damages otherwise owed to the company.  In this 
sense, international investment law directly contradicts and will 
trump domestic law provisions by allowing shareholders to ad-
vance claims for reflective loss. 
Governance effects include international investment law’s ob-
servable impact on the internal structure of the management and 
control relationships within the corporation, as well as relation-
ships between the shareholders and the company and its creditors.  
The rules on reflective loss allow shareholders to bring a claim in 
ISDS without consulting the management of the company and tak-
ing into account the company’s interests.  The rules also give 
shareholders leverage in any negotiations with the management of 
the company.  Additionally, they allow shareholders to benefit di-
rectly at the expense of the company and its creditors once the 
damages are awarded to the shareholders. 
As the number of investor-state arbitrations continues to grow, 
more data will become available on disputes where shareholders 
have exercised their rights and benefited directly at the expense of 
the corporation and its creditors.  The Eskosol decision demon-
strates that the problem is no longer theoretical, and that interna-
tional law is not concerned about its impact on corporate law and 
governance.  And the potential disruptive effects of reflective loss 
claims are increasing since the share of foreign shareholders in 
most leading corporate law jurisdictions continues to grow.  For 
instance, current data on foreign ownership in corporations shows 
that “half of the listed companies in the U.K and Belgium, 40 % of 
the companies in France and Germany and around 30 % of the 
companies in Spain and Italy have a large foreign shareholder.”205  
This suggests that “countries with advanced capital markets and 
                                                   
205  OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 248 n.32 (citing Gaukrodger, supra 
note 16, at 49). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/5
 
2018] Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss 241 
traditional BITs may be beginning to see their first shareholder 
claims.”206  This may also “raise the profile of the question of the 
comparative treatment of shareholders.”207 
International investment law and, in particular, rules on reflec-
tive loss claims also lead to structural effects by providing incen-
tives to corporations and shareholders to restructure, in particular, 
to benefit from a more advantageous investor protection regime.  
Restructuring can be motivated by legitimate business and tax con-
siderations,208 but may also be the product of opportunistic ac-
tions—such as treaty- or forum-shopping—by the management or 
controlling shareholder.209  The investor’s initial decision to estab-
lish a local company is often motivated by business considerations 
or legal requirements, such as a requirement to establish a local 
company in the host state as a condition of operating in the coun-
try.210  Once the investments are established, the corporate owner-
ship chain can change over time as part of the normal course of 
business.  Foreign investors may also restructure in response to the 
regulatory change in the host state to gain access to a BIT and 
ICSID or to benefit from a more advantageous investor protection 
regime.211  Apart from restructuring, foreign investors may seek 
the benefits of IIAs by transferring assets to new or existing entities 
or by changing corporate nationality.212  This practice is not in itself 
                                                   
206  Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 49.  
207  Id. 
208  See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 242 (noting that intra-group as-
set transfers may be undertaken to secure a tax advantage). 
209  In fact, the allegations of abuse of the BITs through restructuring or other 
corporate changes, as well as treaty-shopping are often made by respondents in 
investor-state arbitrations.  For instance, Venezuela argued in Mobil Corporation v. 
Venezuela that Mobil has abused the right by establishing a holding company in 
the Netherlands and thereby restructuring its investments after they were made to 
allegedly gain access to ICSID.  See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶ 32 (June 
10, 2010) (noting Venezuela’s allegations that restructuring was completed “to 
‘position’ the Claimants for disputes that ‘had arisen’.”). 
210  Domestic rules and regulations differ in this respect, but the requirement 
is common across jurisdictions.  See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that 
“many States require the establishment of a local company as a precondition for 
foreign investment.”). 
211  See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶ 204 (“[T]he aim of the restruc-
turing . . . was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the 
Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT.  
The Tribunal considers that this was a perfectly legitimate goal as far as it con-
cerned future disputes.” (emphasis added)).  
212  See Voon et al., supra note 71, at 41 (“Host states not infrequently find 
themselves responding to claims by investors under international investment 
agreements (IIAs) following a series of corporate steps to enable the claim to take 
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illegal under international investment law,213 although it under-
standably produced a furious reaction from host states, which in 
various cases have argued that corporate restructuring and asset 
transfers constitute an abuse of corporate form,214 abuse of right,215 
abuse of process,216 abuse of the treaty regime,217 or fraud.218  How-
ever, as I have emphasized in this Article, the effects of corporate 
                                                                                                                   
place: restructuring of existing chains of corporate ownership;  transfers of assets 
to new or existing entities; or changes in corporate nationality.”); see also Autopis-
ta Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 27, 2001), 16 ICSID Rev. 469 
(2001) (regarding a Mexican investor who restructured its investment in Venezue-
la by transferring 75% of its shares to a U.S. corporation; under a concession 
agreement between the parties, such transfer allowed submission of a claim to the 
ICSID arbitration because a majority of shareholders in the Venezuelan invest-
ment were nationals of a country party to the ICSID Convention—the United 
States); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on 
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 450 (2005) 
(regarding a U.S. corporation that owned 55% shares in the corporation organized 
under the laws of Bolivia, but transferred them to a Dutch company before filing 
for an arbitration under the Dutch-Bolivian BIT). 
213  See Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision 
on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 330 (holding that “it is not uncom-
mon in practice and—absent a particular limitation—not illegal to locate one’s op-
eration in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and legal en-
vironment in terms, for example, of taxation or the substantive law of the 
jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT.”). 
214  See, e.g., Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 40 (“When there is – as the Respondent contends is the case 
here – an abuse of a corporate structure, the Tribunal should look beyond the ap-
parent facts and lift the corporate veil.”). 
215  See, e.g., Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶¶ 161–85 (noting that Vene-
zuela argued, in particular, that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction because 
the corporate restructuring by claimants constituted an abuse of right.  In reply, 
claimants argued that the corporate restructuring was motivated by business rea-
sons—the royalty rate increase by Venezuela in late 2004 and thereafter new in-
vestments projected and made by claimants.  Claimants also argued that the re-
structuring was completed before Venezuela announced nationalization of 
claimants’ oil projects in Venezuela); id. ¶ 205 (considering that to restructure in-
vestments only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT for pre-existing disputes 
would constitute “an abusive manipulation” of the system of international in-
vestment protection under the ICSID Convention and the BITs). 
216  See, e.g., Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 176–80 
(Sept. 3, 2001) (describing the alleged abuse of process). 
217  See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶412 (Sept. 13, 2001) (finding no abuse of the treaty 
regime where two related claimants in the chain of corporate ownership bring vir-
tually identical claims under two separate treaties). 
218  See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, De-
cision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 331 (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID 
Rev. 450 (2005) (finding an insufficient basis to support an allegation of fraud). 
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restructuring expand beyond the international law arena.  They af-
fect the inner structure of the corporation and contribute to the 
ability of shareholders to bring reflective loss claims. 
Most importantly, as further discussed below, domestic corpo-
rate law and international investment law are not equipped to deal 
with the reflective loss claims and their effects on corporate law, 
governance, and structure.  This suggests that the only solution to 
the problem of reflective loss claims might be in private ordering. 
 
4.  SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF REFLECTIVE LOSS CLAIMS 
 
Legal scholars and arbitration practitioners have suggested 
several international law and civil procedure solutions to address 
concerns about the multiplicity of claims, such as the risk of double 
recovery and inconsistent awards.  In theory, they can be used in 
addressing distortions created to corporate law and governance by 
reflective loss claims.  However, as further explained below, most 
international law and civil procedure rules are unable to resolve 
the problem of reflective loss claims for practical or legal reasons.  
In addition, domestic law—most notably, corporate law that regu-
lates intra-company relationships—is generally powerless against 
shareholder claims for reflective loss.  This is because provisions 
under domestic law that seek to limit the shareholder’s ability to 
bring claims in ISDS—in direct contradiction to a state’s obliga-
tions under investor protection treaties—will likely be trumped by 
the state’s international law obligations. 
In the absence of a feasible solution under domestic or interna-
tional law, private ordering offers the best approach to tackle re-
flective loss claims.  It allows shareholders and the company to 
agree on the ways to coordinate their competing claims, litigation 
strategy and/or settlement terms with the host state.  Moreover, to 
avoid the problem all together, self-regulation allows shareholders 
to waive their right to submit a reflective loss claim in ISDS, giving 
up their right for the benefit of the company and its stakeholders.  
This allows restoring the processes of the management and control 
within the corporation and reducing corporate structural changes 
motivated by ISDS.  As a result, the corporation is brought back to 
the legal framework provided by domestic corporate law. 
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4.1.  Invoking the help of international law 
 
One way to resolve the problem of reflective loss is to employ 
the help of international law.  Since the shareholder claims for re-
flective loss are directly authorized by IIAs, they could be restrict-
ed or eliminated altogether through treaty revision and more care-
ful treaty drafting.  Instead of allowing shareholders to bring 
claims in ISDS and benefit from monetary damages, the treaty 
could mimic the domestic law approach and reserve such right to 
the company.  To account for cases where the company is no long-
er able to bring a claim (for instance, where the corporation has 
been dissolved), the treaty may grant shareholders the exceptional 
right to bring such a claim, but provide that damages are to be 
awarded only to the corporation (or its successors), but not to the 
shareholders bringing the claim.  This approach would follow the 
NAFTA solution, and would largely eliminate independent claims 
by shareholders. 
Although invoking the help of international law is a logical so-
lution, it will be very difficult to apply in practice.  It would require 
a revision of the majority of nearly 3,300 IIAs, which is unlikely to 
happen.  It also requires a political will on the side of contracting 
states, which may be more concerned about attracting foreign in-
vestors—through both foreign direct investments and portfolio in-
vestments—than about distortions to corporate law and govern-
ance created by shareholder claims under investor protection 
treaties.  Consequently, this solution is possible in theory but high-
ly unlikely to occur in practice. 
 
4.2.  Civil procedure solutions 
 
Procedural law offers another solution to the reflective loss 
claims.  At first sight, it appears that the doctrines of res judicata 
(claim preclusion) or collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) could 
prevent parallel or consecutive claims brought independently by 
the company and its shareholders.  The doctrine of res judicata 
serves as “[a]n affirmative defense barring the same parties from 
litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim 
arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that 
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could have been—but was not—raised in the first suit.”219  The 
doctrine thus bars a second lawsuit between the same parties (or 
parties in privity with the original parties) arising from the same 
transaction following a final judgment on the merits.220  The doc-
trine of collateral estoppel “[bars] a party from relitigating an issue 
determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the sec-
ond action differs significantly from the first one.”221  As such, the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not reduce multiple proceed-
ings, but helps to achieve greater consistency among arbitration 
awards rendered to the company and—possibly independently—
to its shareholders.  Successive investment arbitrations by a com-
pany and a shareholder (or vice versa) can sometimes be dismissed 
under the doctrines of abuse of process or abuse of right, especially 
in cases of vexatious arbitration.222   
To address concerns over successive arbitrations, arbitral tri-
bunals have sought to invoke the doctrines of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel.223  Investment tribunals are largely in consensus 
today that res judicata constitutes a general principle of law and a 
rule of international law.224  They therefore have invoked the doc-
trine of res judicata in cases where the rules of international law 
were to be applied in addition to an investment treaty.225  Similarly, 
                                                   
219  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (10th ed. 2014). 
220  See id. (providing several definitions for the term “res judicata”). 
221  Id. at 318. 
222  See, e.g., RSM Prod. Corp. et al. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, 
Award, ¶ 4.6.17 (Dec. 10, 2010) (describing the respondent’s reliance on notable 
commentators from common-law jurisdictions supporting the view that succes-
sive proceedings should be dismissed “even where the requirements of res judicata 
may not have been met . . . particularly . . . if the successive proceedings are vexa-
tious.”) 
223  See, e.g., id. ¶ 7.1.7 (“[S]hareholders . . . may undertake litigation to pursue 
or defend rights belonging to the corporation.  However, . . . [i]f they wish to 
claim standing on the basis of their indirect interest in corporate assets, they must 
be subject to defences . . . including collateral estoppel.”). 
224  See Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.11 (Aug. 25, 2014) (“In the Tribunal’s view, the doc-
trine of res judicata is a general principle of law and is thus an applicable rule of 
international law within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1131.”). 
225  See, e.g., Mobil Invs. Can. Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/6, De-
cision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 187 (July 13, 2018) ("The principle of res 
judicata has long formed part of many—if not most—systems of national law. . . . 
[I]t is now an established principle of international law."); id. ¶ 191 ("The question, 
therefore, is not whether a principle of res judicata is embodied in international 
law but rather what is its extent."); Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican 
States (II), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Mexico’s Preliminary Objection Con-
cerning the Previous Proceedings, Decision of the Tribunal, ¶ 39 (June 26, 2002) 
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arbitral tribunals have relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
to prevent re-litigation of an issue in a subsequent investment arbi-
tration.  For instance, the tribunal in the second RSM arbitration, 
which was brought under the U.S.-Grenada BIT, showed deference 
to a prior ICSID arbitration brought under an underlying contract 
between the parties invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel.226  
The tribunal held that the claimants were barred on the ground of 
collateral estoppel from re-litigating conclusions of fact and law 
concerning the parties’ rights and obligations that were already re-
solved in a prior arbitration.227 
However, in practice it can be difficult to achieve the applica-
tion of res judicata in investment arbitration.  For the doctrine of 
res judicata to operate, one has to satisfy the triple identity test, 
which requires that the parties, the object (a type of relief sought), 
and the ground (the claims, or the legal arguments relied upon by 
the parties) to be identical in both arbitrations.228  Such stringent in-
terpretation of the doctrine of res judicata reduces the operation of 
the doctrine and allows the second arbitration to proceed.  This 
frequently happens because of the lack of identity between the par-
                                                                                                                   
(“There is no doubt that res judicata is a principle of international law and even a 
general principle of law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the statute of the 
International Court of Justice.”); see also Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.37 (Aug. 25, 2014) ("Applying 
NAFTA Article 1131(1), the rules of international law and the UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration Rules, the Tribunal concludes that the Apotex I & II Award, with its rele-
vant reasons, operates in this arbitration as res judicata as regards both named par-
ties to that arbitration, namely Apotex Inc. and the Respondent.  It remains to be 
considered in what manner it operates in regard to the specific claims made by 
Apotex Inc. in this arbitration."). 
226  See RSM Prod. Co. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, Award ¶ 7.1.5 
(Dec. 10, 2010) (“[The claimants] were . . . privies of RSM at the time [of the prior 
arbitration].  As such, they, like RSM, are bound by those factual and other deter-
minations regarding questions and rights arising out of or relating to the Agree-
ment.”). 
227  See id. ¶¶ 7.1.5–7.1.6 (explaining that the parties in the two arbitrations 
were not identical because, for the second ICSID arbitration, the company—RSM 
Production Corporation—was joined by its three shareholders.  However, the tri-
bunal held that the shareholders were bound by the results of the first ICSID arbi-
tration because they were the only shareholders of RSM, jointly owning 100% of 
the company). 
228  See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Multiple Proceedings—New Challenges for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION—THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2013 3, 8 (Arthur W. Rovine 
ed., 2015) (“[T]he main difficulty with [res judicata and lis pendens] is that in gen-
eral they come into play only if the so-called triple identity test is met.  The triple 
identity test requires identity of facts, parties and causes of action.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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ties in cases where the tribunal adheres to the formalistic interpre-
tation of the treaty, refusing to look behind the separate legal iden-
tity of related claimants.  For instance, the respondent in the CME 
v. Czech Republic arbitration argued that the arbitral tribunal should 
reconsider its partial award (and apply res judicata at the quantum 
stage) in view of the award in the parallel arbitration in Lauder v. 
Czech Republic.229  However, the arbitral tribunal in CME concluded 
that the respondent explicitly “waived [its res judicata and lis pen-
dens] defenses by refusing to accept any of the Claimant’s pro-
posals to coordinate the two proceedings.”230  Furthermore, the tri-
bunal established that res judicata did not apply in substance 
because the parties in both arbitrations were not identical, they in-
voked different BITs (and, consequently, different claims based on 
these BITs), and the tribunal could not ascertain whether the facts 
and circumstances presented to the tribunals in both arbitrations 
were the same.231  In the Blusun and Eskosol arbitrations, Italy un-
successfully argued that Blusun (a shareholder) and Eskosol (the 
company) must be considered the same investor, despite the fact 
they are two different legal entities.232 
Some tribunals have looked into whether the application of res 
judicata in investment arbitration could be established through the 
application of a concept of a “single economic entity,” which dis-
counts the separate legal existence of the shareholder and the com-
pany.233  For instance, the arbitral tribunal in CME v. Czech Republic 
considered the issue, but concluded that prior arbitral tribunals 
                                                   
229  See CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 199 (Mar. 14, 2003) (“The Respondent’s view is that 
the rule of res judicata must be applied by the Tribunal at the Quantum Phase. . . .  
The London Final Award not only was res judicata at the time the Partial Award 
was issued; it remains res judicata for the Quantum Phase and, therefore, cannot be 
ignored by the Tribunal.”). 
230  Id. ¶ 430; see also id. ¶¶ 426–427 (noting that in the first stage of this arbi-
tration, the Czech Republic “refused any coordination of [Lauder v. Czech Republic] 
and this arbitration”, and “[a]t the hearing . . . declined anew to accept any of the 
Claimant’s alternative proposals” to coordinate the arbitration). 
231  See id. ¶ 432 (‘The Tribunal further is of the view that the principle of res 
judicata does not apply in favour of the London Arbitration for more than one 
reason. . . . the Tribunal cannot judge whether the facts submitted to the two tri-
bunals for decision are identical . . . .”). 
232  See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 125 (“Italy further argues that Blusun and 
Eskosol must be considered the same investor for the purposes of Article 
26(3)(b)(i) of the ECT, even though they are two different legal entities.”). 
233  See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 436 (Mar. 14, 2003) (considering the concept of the 
“single economic entity” and the “company group” theory). 
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and the courts had accepted the concept only in exceptional cas-
es—in particular, competition law.234  The same tribunal acknowl-
edged that “prominent authorities” had promoted a “company 
group” theory in international arbitration, but refused to follow it, 
having established that the concept was not generally accepted in 
international arbitration.235 
The application of res judicata in investment arbitrations can 
also be restricted by the state parties’ interpretation of their inves-
tor protection treaties.  For instance, in the CME arbitration, the tri-
bunal’s view with respect to res judicata was supported by the 
“common position” of the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, 
the state parties to the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT invoked in 
the arbitration.  In their common position, the Netherlands and the 
Czech Republic stated that the Lauder arbitration in London did not 
govern the CME arbitration in Stockholm.236  In particular, they 
stressed that the claims in two arbitrations were made by different 
legal entities and that “[c]laims of different legal entities, even 
though they may be controlled by the same economic entity, are 
not necessarily the same claims . . . .”237  
Once the award was rendered, the Czech Republic itself in-
voked the doctrines of res judicata and lis pendens as part of its 
challenge of the award at the Svea Court of Appeal.238  There, the 
Czech Republic argued that non-application of these doctrines vio-
lated the public order of Sweden (the seat of arbitration) and there-
fore warranted setting aside of the award.  Rejecting this argument, 
the court noted that there was no identity between the claimant 
parties in the Lauder and CME arbitrations, as required by the 
Swedish law.239  The court refused to pierce the corporate veil not-
                                                   
234  See id. (“Only in exceptional cases, in particular in competition law, have 
tribunals or law courts accepted a concept of a ‘single economic entity,’ which al-
lows discounting of the separate legal existences of the shareholder and the com-
pany, mostly, to allow the joining of a parent of a subsidiary to an arbitration.”). 
235  See id. (“Also a ‘company group’ theory is not generally accepted in inter-
national arbitration (although promoted by prominent authorities) and there are 
no precedents of which the Tribunal is aware for its general acceptance.  In this 
arbitration the situation is even less compelling.”). 
236  See id. ¶ 437 (“The agreed minutes of the Common Position of the Nether-
lands and the Czech Republic . . . support the Tribunal’s view that the London 
Award does not govern this arbitration.”). 
237  Id. (citation omitted). 
238  See Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Court of Appeals] 2003-05-15 T 8735-01 (Swed.), 
https://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/views/pages/getfile.ashx?portalId=89
&docId=1242805&propId=1578 [https://perma.cc/8MAA-P749]. 
239  See id. at 98 (“[O]ne of the fundamental conditions for lis pendens and res 
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ing that “no international cases have been presented in the case in 
which, in an actual situation of lis pendens and res judicata, a con-
trolling minority shareholder has been equated with the compa-
ny.”240 
As a result of failing the triple identity test in investor-state ar-
bitrations, in particular, with respect of the identity of the parties, 
the res judicata doctrine has failed to provide relief against multi-
ple proceedings in ISDS.241  To mitigate against the strict triple 
identity test, advocates of ISDS have suggested to apply in invest-
ment arbitration “a relaxed notion” of res judicata.242  Some arbitral 
tribunals have formulated and applied a less stringent test of res 
judicata.243  However, other authors have pointed out that “it is un-
clear how this relaxed standard could be justified and what its pre-
cise content would be.”244 
Other procedural solutions include consolidation of arbitra-
tions, joinder of parties, and—although less desirable for share-
holders and their companies—submissions by non-parties.  How-
ever, the application of these mechanisms—if they are available 
under applicable arbitration rules—helps largely the defending 
state, but not the company.  In theory, consolidation and joinder 
would allow the defending state to avoid double recovery and to 
reduce the likelihood of conflicting awards.  However, these pro-
cedural techniques do not diminish the conflict of interests be-
                                                                                                                   
judicata is that the same parties are involved in both cases . . . . Identity between a 
minority shareholder, albeit a controlling one, . . . and the actual company cannot . 
. . exist in a case such the instant one.”). 
240  Id. at 98; see also id. at 69 (observing that in the present case, Lauder held 
no more than 30% of the share capital in CME’s parent company and was a con-
trolling shareholder in that company). 
241  See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 228, at 8 (noting that in investment arbi-
tration multiple proceedings often occur because the triple identity test is not met 
since proceedings are initiated by different actors). 
242  Id. 
243  See, e.g., Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶¶ 7.15–7.16 (Aug. 25, 2014) (discussing several in-
ternational tribunals and scholars who questioned a division between the object 
and the ground of arbitration as two separate conditions of the triple identity test 
and have used a simpler analysis for establishing res judicata).  Some tribunals 
take a more relaxed approach to res judicata.  See, e.g., Libananco Holdings Co. 
Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award, ¶ 548 (Sept. 2, 
2011) (finding “the application of a domestic rule of res judicata is there to prevent 
the re-litigation of an issue that has already been authoritatively determined; a 
treaty rule may serve the different purpose of preventing forum-shopping.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
244  Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 228, at 8. 
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tween shareholders and the company, since they do not prevent 
shareholders from submitting their own claims to arbitration.  As 
to the submissions by non-parties, they allow the shareholder or 
the company to indirectly defend their rights by presenting their 
arguments in each other’s arbitrations, but these submissions do 
not preclude the shareholder (or the company) from commencing 
their own arbitration to defend their rights directly. 
However, arbitration rules commonly applied in investment 
arbitrations—the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules and the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules—do not provide for consolidation or 
joinder, although these procedural mechanisms are increasingly 
available under the rules of arbitral institutions, such as the Inter-
national Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce(SCC).  In the absence of specific rules, consolidation and 
joinder are only available if the parties to a dispute agree to consol-
idate their arbitrations or join additional parties.  In particular, this 
requires willingness to consolidate or join the party from the 
shareholder and its company.  Where the parties cannot agree, as 
was the case in the Blusun and Eskosol arbitrations, the hands of the 
tribunal are tied and consolidation or joinder are not available. 
Other techniques, such as using the same tribunal members for 
different arbitrations, can be used to increase the consistency of ar-
bitral awards rendered by tribunals in separate arbitrations com-
menced by the company and its shareholders.  However, this also 
requires the agreement by the parties, which is often hard to 
achieve in these cases because the interests of the shareholders and 
the company conflict.  Moreover, it may be difficult to appoint the 
same tribunal in cases where the first arbitration has concluded by 
the time the second arbitration is commenced. 
Additionally, investment tribunals have sought to avoid dou-
ble recovery by apportioning damages between the shareholders 
and their company.  The apportionment of damages may allow re-
ducing double recovery, but is hard to do in practice as the loss of 
the shareholders is reflective of the company’s loss.  In a given dis-
pute, it is often unclear to which extent a particular shareholder 
has contributed to the foreign investments and was affected by the 
breach.  In any case, the apportionment of damages provides for 
direct compensation of shareholders for reflective loss.  As such, it 
does not restore the distortions created by reflective loss claims on 
corporate law and governance. 
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4.3.  Private ordering solution 
 
Private ordering may offer a superior solution to restoring the 
corporate governance dynamics distorted by shareholder claims 
for reflective loss.  Viewed from the contractual theory point of 
view, a corporation is a “nexus of contracts” among participants in 
the organization, such as shareholders, directors, creditors, suppli-
ers, and employees.245  Under this view, the role of corporate law is 
limited to enforcing private contracts, and fiduciary duties “serve 
as a legal constraint on managerial opportunism.”246  As a corollary 
to that, the freedom of contract suggests that participants in the 
corporation shall be free to contract as they wish.  The Delaware 
courts have also described internal corporate relationship as a 
“flexible contract” formed by corporate law together with the cor-
porate charter and bylaws.247  
Private ordering, or self-regulation, allows private parties to 
adopt systems of rules to regulate their relations within the con-
straints of existing laws and regulation.  Regardless of the view of 
the corporation as a contractual or a legal product, private ordering 
offers a practical solution to the reflective loss problem.  As a gen-
eral rule, the right to bring claims in investment arbitration shall be 
reserved to the corporation.  To address the issue of shareholder 
claims for reflective loss, corporations can adopt targeted provi-
sions in the corporation’s governing documents—corporate char-
ters or bylaws.  Such provisions can provide for a waiver by share-
holders of their right to bring claims under international 
                                                   
245  See Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 99, 100 (1989) (“The contractual theory views the corporation as 
founded in private contract, where the role of the state is limited to enforcing con-
tracts.  In this regard, a state charter merely recognizes the existence of a ‘nexus of 
contracts’ called a corporation.”). 
246  Id. at 119. 
247  See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 
2010) (holding that “[c]orporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corpo-
ration’s shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”); Law-
son v. Household Finance Corp., 152 A 723, 727 (Del. 1930) (“Ever since the deci-
sion in the Dartmouth College Case . . . it has been generally recognized in this 
country that the charter of a corporation is a contract both between the corpora-
tion and the state and the corporation and its stockholders.”); Centaur Partners, IV 
v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) (“Corporate charters 
and by-laws are contracts among the shareholders of a corporation and the gen-
eral rules of contract interpretation are held to apply.”). 
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investment treaties.  In addition, provisions in the corporation’s 
governing documents can stipulate that any damages resulting 
from a breach by a foreign state of investor protection obligations 
are to be awarded to the corporation. 
Such private ordering solution aims to bar investment arbitra-
tions of shareholder claims for reflective loss at the outset.  Once 
the waiver provisions are adopted in the corporate charters or by-
laws, they attach to shares and bind the shareholders who accept 
the terms of these provisions by acquiring shares in the corpora-
tion.  However, such a waiver system would only work if the arbi-
tral tribunals are willing to prioritize contract waivers over invest-
ment treaty provisions granting shareholders a direct right of 
action.  As of now, however, as Arato has observed, tribunals seem 
to be doing the opposite—rigidly and formalistically “prioritizing 
treaty provisions over negotiated contractual bargains.”248  This 
practice is flawed from a contractual point of view and should be 
abandoned if we really treat consent to arbitration in investment 
treaties as an open offer to arbitrate, which is then accepted (albeit 
with amendments through a waiver of shareholder claims) by a 
foreign investor when it files for arbitration.  The proposed private 
ordering solution would privilege party choice, which, as Arato 
has argued in the context of transnational investment contracts, is 
“the best way to protect both the private law values of fairness and 
efficiency and the state’s capacity to govern in the public inter-
est.”249 
The enforcement of the waiver provisions will rest with the 
board, which can choose not to enforce the waiver and allow a 
shareholder to proceed in arbitration, for instance, where the cor-
poration is unable to bring its own claim.  In effect, this solution al-
lows restoring the domestic corporate law prohibition on share-
holder claims for reflective loss, and largely follows the NAFTA 
approach to shareholder claims in investment arbitration. 
It is also a sound solution from a theory point of view.  If the 
corporation is the product of private contracts, it is only logical to 
amend a contract between the shareholders and the management 
for the benefit of the corporation at large.  The state can always in-
tervene to correct distortions created by reflective loss claims on 
corporate law and governance, for instance, by revisiting the terms 
                                                   
248  Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 351, 357 (2016).  
249  Id. at 356. 
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of a state’s investor protection treaties.  Until then, private systems 
of rules offer a superior solution to the problem of reflective loss 
claims by allowing the shareholders and the corporation to agree 
that (1) the right to bring a claim in investment arbitration general-
ly rests with the corporation, and (2) only the corporation can be 
awarded damages for losses resulting from a breach of investor 
protection obligations. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Reflective loss claims allow treaty-protected shareholders to 
bring individual claims in investment arbitrations for losses suf-
fered by the corporation due to a breach of investor protection ob-
ligations.  The right to bring these claims provides shareholders 
with leverage in their negotiations with corporate management 
and allows them to individually make decisions on important is-
sues that affect the corporation.  Reflective loss claims also allow 
shareholders to divert corporate assets by collecting damages 
awarded to them in investment arbitrations.  Especially for com-
panies in financial distress, this may harm the corporation, its cred-
itors, non-protected shareholders, and all other stakeholders of the 
corporation.  In the absence of a feasible solution under domestic 
and international law and civil procedure rules, private ordering 
offers the best approach to tackle the problem of reflective loss 
claims.  It allows shareholders and the corporation to agree on the 
waiver of the shareholder right to claim for reflective loss in in-
vestment arbitration, thereby bringing the corporation back to the 
legal framework of domestic corporate law. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
